From Tradition to Modernity: a Socio-Historical Interpretation on China\u27s Struggle toward Modernization since the mid-19th Century by Tsai, Wen-hui
OccAsioNAl PApERs/ 
REpRiNTS SERiEs 
iN CoNTEMpoRARY 
AsiAN STudiEs 
NUMBER 1 - 1986 (72) 
FROM TRADITION TO MODERNITY: 
A SOCIO-HISTORICAL 
INTERPRETATION ON 
CHINA'S STRUGGLE TOWARD 
MODERNIZATION SINCE 
THE MID-19TH CENTURY 
Wen-hui Tsai 
ScltoolofLAw 
UNivERsiTy 
of 
MARylANd-
' 
D 
6 
' • 
0 
' • • 
0 •• 
~ 
0 
Occasional Papers/Reprint Series 
in Contemporary Asian Studies 
General Editor: Hungdah Chiu 
Executive Editor: Mitchell A. Silk 
Managing Editor: Chih-Yu Wu 
Editorial Advisory Board 
Professor Robert A. Scalapino, University of California 
at Berkeley 
Professor Martin Wilbur, Columbia University 
Professor Gaston J. Sigur, George Washington University 
Professor Shao-chuan Leng, University of Virginia 
Professor Lawrence W. Beer, Lafayette College 
Professor James Hsiung, New York University 
Dr. Lih-wu Han, Political Science Association of the 
Republic of China 
Professor J. S. Prybyla, The Pennsylvania State University 
Professor Toshio Sawada, Sophia University, Japan 
Professor Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Center for International 
Politics, University of Munich, Federal Republic of Germany 
Professor Choon-ho Park, International Legal Studies 
Korea University, Republic of Korea 
Published with the cooperation of the Maryland International Law Society 
All contributions (in English only) and communications should be sent to 
Professor Hungdah Chiu, University of Maryland School of Law, 
500 West Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201 USA. 
All publications in this series reflect only the views of the authors. 
While the editor accepts responsibility for the selection of materials to be published, 
the individual author is responsible for statements of facts and expressions of opinion con-
tained therein. 
Subscription is US $15.00 for 6 issues (regardless of the price of individual issues) in 
the United States and Canada and $20.00 for overseas. Check should be addressed to 
OPRSCAS and sent to Professor Hungdah Chiu. 
Price for single copy of this issue: US $4.00 
© 1986 by Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Inc. 
ISSN 0730-0107 
ISBN 0-942182-74-X 
FROM TRADITION TO MODERNITY: A SOCIO-
HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIOI-i ON CHINA'S 
STRUGGLES TOWARD MODERNIZATION SINCE 
THE MID-19TH CENTURY 
Wen-hui Tsai* 
Table of Contents 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................. . 
II. WESTERN THEORIES ON CHINESE 
MODERNIZATION: A CRITICAL REVIEW ..... . 
1. The Role of Traditional Religion in China's 
Modernization ................................ . 
2. Chinese Family Structure and Modernization ... . 
3. Chinese Political Structure and Modernization .. . 
4. External Factors in Chinese Modernization ..... . 
Ill. CHINESE VIEWS ON MODERNIZATION EFFORT 
1. Hu Shih and the Modernizing Elite ............ . 
2. Hu Shih and Chinese Traditional Elite ......... . 
IV. FOUR MAJOR DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES ..... . 
V. THE "TAIWAN MIRACLE" ....................... . 
1. Industrialization and Economic Growth ........ . 
2. Social and Political Modernization ............. . 
VI. HISTORICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA'S 
MODERNIZATION ................................ . 
VII. TOWARD A SYNTHETICAL THEORY ........... . 
1. Two General Modernization Theories .......... . 
2. A Synthetical View ............................ . 
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS ....................... . 
1 
2 
3 
9 
12 
17 
19 
21 
30 
33 
43 
43 
48 
62 
68 
68 
71 
75 
* Wen-hui Tsai, born in Taiwan, the Republic of China. He received his B.A. degree 
in sociology from National Taiwan University in 1964. From 1968 to 1974, he studied at 
University of California at Berkeley and received both his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in soci-
ology from Berkeley. He joined the faculty at Indiana University-Purdue University at 
Fort Wayne in 1975. He is currently Professor and Chairperson of Department of Sociol-
ogy and Anthropology at IPFW. His main interest is in the process of modernization. He 
has published several books and a number of articles on this subject. An earlier draft of 
this essay was published as a working paper entitled "The Modernization of China" by the 
Institute of the Three Principles of the People, Academia Sinica, Republic of China in 
1982. 

FROM TRADITION TO MODERNITY: A SOCIO· 
HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION ON CHINA'S 
STRUGGLE TOWARD MODERNIZATION SINCE 
THE MID-19TH CENTURY 
Wen-hui Tsai 
I. INTRODUCfiON 
In our human history, no society has ever existed in a state of 
complete equilibrium. Various factors-physical, demographic, social 
and so on-are always present, making new demands. Change is al-
ways an on-going social phenomenon. Nevertheless, the changes that 
have occurred during the past two hundred years can be seen as one of 
the most remarkable and fascinating experiences human beings have 
ever had. The technological development, two world wars, urbaniza-
tion, the population explosion, the end of colonization in non-western 
societies are the striking revolutions of our time. Among these, the 
end of colonization, the emergence of new nations, and the effort of 
modernization by non-western societies are of special significance for 
us. 
Indeed, the struggle for independence and the effort to achieve 
modernization in order to join the ranks of the prosperous, powerful, 
and peaceful in non-western societies involve not only the domestic 
development of societies but also the relations among them. Moderni-
zation thus becomes a special kind of hope to the people of non-west-
em societies. Political scientist David Apter once noted that "it 
embodies all the supreme human desires." 1 For the people in these 
societies, traditional ways of doing things are no longer the framework 
within which modem societies conduct their business. To them, 
"modem" means dynamic, concerned with people, democratic and 
equalitarian, scientific, economically advanced, sovereign, and 
inft uen tial. 
But modernization is no easy task. This is particularly true in 
non-western societies. The problem of modernization in many non-
western societies arise partially due to the lack of a smooth tran<>for-
mation based upon societal internal differentiation. S.N. Eisenstadt 
said, "Modernization is the process of change toward those types of 
I. David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1965), p. I. 
(1) 
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social, economic, and political system that has developed in western 
Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nine-
teenth."2 Similarly, in Asia, the modern situation, as Robert N. 
Bellah has found, "did not arise out of the East Asian past, either as 
natural growth or as pathological observation; rather it came from 
without. It came often sharply, even brutally, and it had no roots in 
the past. " 3 
Just like her Asian neighbors, the problems of modernization in 
China are also extremely complicated. The history of modern China 
is without any doubt a history of China's struggle toward moderniza-
tion. It is a fascinating subject that has received a great deal of atten-
tion in the social science community in the recent years. The main 
purpose of this essay is to review the existing literatures on Chinese 
modernization with a goal of developing a theoretical synthesis that 
could explain the socio-historical process of modernization in China. 
This essay will begin with a critical review of theories of Chinese 
modernization in western literatures, followed by a discussion of the 
views from Chinese intellectuals. Then, a four-stage developmental 
process of China's modernization effort during the past one hundred 
and forty years will be presented, with special attention given to a .de-
tail discussion on the socio-economic modernization of Taiwan since 
1949. Finally, characteristics of China's modernization process will be 
outlined and a theoretical synthesis based on the existing literatures 
and China's experience will be proposed at the conclusion. 
II. WESTERN THEORIES ON CHINESE 
MODERNIZATION: A CRITICAL REVIEW 
Hundred of books and articles have been written about China's 
modernization, and several theories have also been proposed in recent 
years in an attempt to explain this experience. However, most of these 
theories seem to be preoccupied with the following two empirical 
questions. 
The first is concerned with the analysis of the structural weakness 
in the traditional Chinese society which handicapped the possible 
modernization before the 19th century. Such theorists as Max Weber, 
Marion J. Levy, Robert N. Bellah, S.N. Eisenstadt, and Frances V. 
Moulder have all at one time or another tried to explain why moderni-
2. S.N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Pren-
tice-Hall, 1966), p.l. 
3. Robert N. Bellah, Tokuguwa Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 101. 
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zation or industrialization did not occur within the Chinese traditional 
social structure. 
The second question that China specialists are interested in con-
cerns with the failure of Chinese modernization programs proposed 
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A few researchers seem 
to be puzzled by the fact that although China and Japan started on 
their way toward modernization at almost the same time, Japan suc-
ceeded in becoming a modern nation-state while China failed. This 
group of researchers tended to focus their studies on analyzing con-
flicts between modern Chinese social and political structures and mod-
ernization planning itself. Examples of this focus are Lucian Pye's 
work on the spirit of modern Chinese politics4 and Barrington 
Moore's comparison of the modernization efforts of the Nationalists 
and the Chinese Communists. 5 
It is without any doubt that our understanding of the process of 
Chinese modernization has been greatly benefited from the above men-
tioned studies. Nevertheless, we feel that the explanations offered in 
them often seem fragmentary as well as narrow-minded. 
Until now, what we really have are many small works aimed at 
explaining the faults of Chinese society and the weakness of various 
Chinese subsystems in developing a Western type of politics and econ-
omy. No attempt has been made, however, to understand the incom-
patibility of the concept of modernization in Chinese existing social 
structure. No one has ever tried, for instance, to investigate the condi-
tions under which modernization became a great evil to the Chinese in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries. There is a lack of awareness in 
the existing literatures that the modernization process the Chinese ex-
perienced is quite different from the one the Western world had exper-
ienced earlier. Thus, any new theory on Chinese modernization has to 
take into account such a difference between China and the West. 
1. The Role of Traditional Religion in China's Modernization 
The most authoritative work on the study of the inability of the 
traditional Chinese social structure to develop a capitalist moderniza-
tion is Max Weber's Religion of China. 6 
The major objective of Weber's work is to demonstrate that 
4. Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1968). 
5. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1967). 
6. Max Weber, Religion of China (N.Y.: Free Press, 1968). 
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China's failure to develop a rational bourgeois capitalism was due to 
the absence of a particular kind of religious ethic for the needed moti-
vation. The Religion of China was intended as a support for the major 
theme in his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 7 in 
which Weber tried to establish the Protestant ethic as an independent 
causal factor in the development of modem capitalism in the West. 
In Religion of China, Weber first examined five major concrete 
factors in the Chinese social system as characterizing features having 
relevance to the functional requirement of modem capitalism: the 
monetary system, cities and guilds, the patrimonial state, kinship or-
ganization, and law. Although Weber saw many unfavorable condi-
tions for the development of capitalism in these five major spheres, he 
did find such favorable ones as the absence of status restriction by 
birth, free migration, free choice of occupation, absence of compulsory 
schooling and military service, and absence of legal restraint on usury 
and trade. Weber said, "From a purely economic point of view, a 
genuine bourgeois industrial capitalism not to appear in China was 
basically due to the lack of a particular mentality,"8 such as that of 
ascetic Protestantism. 
Taking Chinese social structure on the material condition as 
given, Weber then compared the differences between Chinese Con-
fucianism and Western ascetic Protestantism. Table 1 is a comparison 
between Confucianism and Puritanism in Weber's thesis as summa-
rized by Reinhard Bendix. 9 
It was this difference, according to Weber, that contributed to an 
autonomous capitalist development in the West and the absence of a 
similar development in China. Weber noted that, "to a striking degree 
they (the Chinese) lacked rational matter-of-factness, impersonal ra-
tionalism, and the nature of an abstract, impersonal, purposive associ-
ation. True 'communities' were absent, especially in the cities, because 
there were no economic and managerial forms of association or enter-
prise which were purely purposive."10 
Religion of China indeed represents an extremely stimulating 
work in the comparative study of the complex Chinese social system 
and is a source of provocative ideas for the study of its patterns of 
socioeconomic change. The value of this work is so enormous that 
7. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (N.Y.: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1951). 
8. Weber, Religion of China, supra note 6, p. 100. 
9. Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City, N.J.: 
Doubleday, 1962), pp. 140-142. 
10. Weber, Religion of China, supra note 6, p. 240. 
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TABLE 1 
MAX WEBER'S CONCEPTIONS OF CONFUCIANISM 
AND PURITANISM 
Confucianism 
Belief in impersonal, cosmic 
order; tolerance of magic. 
Adjustment to the world to 
maintain harmony of heaven 
and earth; the ideal of order. 
Vigilant self-control for the 
sake of dignity and self-
perfection. 
Absence of prophecy related to 
inviolability of tradition; man 
can avoid the wrath of the 
spirits and be "good" if he acts 
properly. 
Familial piety as the principle 
governing all human relations. 
Kinship relations as the basis 
for commercial transactions, 
voluntary associations, law and 
public administration. 
Distrust of all persons outside 
the extended family. 
Wealth as the basis of dignity 
and self-perfection. 
Puritanism 
Relief in superamundance God; 
rejection of magic. 
Mastery over the world in 
unceasing quest for virtue in 
the eyes of God; the ideal of 
progressive change. 
Vigilant self-control for the 
sake of controlling man's 
wicked nature and doing God's 
will. 
Prophecy makes tradition and 
the world as it is appear 
wicked; man cannot attain 
goodness by his own efforts. 
Subordination of all human 
relations to the service of God. 
Rational Law and agreement as 
the basis for commercial 
transactions, voluntary 
associations, law and public 
administration. 
Trust of all persons who are 
"brothers in the faith." 
Wealth as a temptation and 
unintended by-product of a 
virtuous life. 
most of the studies on Chinese society by contemporary Western 
scholars have often taken it as an indispensable theoretical point of 
departure. Because of its great importance, unfortunately, many of 
Weber's followers have tended to ignore the many empirical problems 
inherent in it. 
In reviewing Weber's Religion of China, one must keep in mind 
that the underlying theoretical orientation of Weber's work on the 
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study of China, India and other civilizations was not so much as to 
prove the existence of the capitalism in these societies, but rather to 
demonstrate the highly unique characteristics of rational capitalist 
economic development in the West. The basic foundation of Weber's 
comparative methodology was thus to demonstrate the great impor-
tance of the rational mentality of the Protestant ethic in the develop-
ment of Western industrialization and the lack of such a mentality in 
all the other great civilizations, including China and India. With this 
preoccupation in mind, Weber thus tended to pick only those factors 
that favored his own arguments. 
More specifically, in the case of China, Weber failed to make a 
necessary distinction between the ideal and actual patterns of social 
behavior in traditional Chinese society. Confucian ethnic, unlike 
Christian ideology, was often regarded only as an ideal that was too 
high to be reached by the common people in traditional China. The 
Confucian ethic was in fact never a major force in popular culture of 
the general population. Even those in the upper level of society rarely 
practiced it as rigidly as was required in the original text of Confucian 
Classics. What is now thought to be conservative may have been in-
terpreted as progressive by different Confucian scholars in different 
periods of China's long history, because the context in Confucian clas-
sics was so vague that it could be interpreted in either way. it is, there-
fore, misleading to take Confucianism as comparable with 
Protestantism, as Weber did. 
Weber also failed to realize that the country of China is too large 
to be taken as a "cultural whole." many China specialists'' have 
noted that in China there are a great many local cultures existing, each 
with its own distinctive characteristics; even two nearby villages may 
sometimes have quite different patterns of behavior norms and values. 
Since Confucian ethic was often merely an ideal pattern, as we have 
argued, the differences existing in local communities must have had 
significant impact on the attitudes of the people living there toward 
socioeconomic development. One apparent example of such a local 
economically oriented culture can be found in Anhui province, for the 
people of Anhui have been one of the most successful and influential 
business groups in China ever since the tenth century; they dominated 
Chinese commercial and banking businesses for many centuries. No 
other territorial group in China has had such distinctive economic ori-
II. E.g., Wolfram Eberhard, A History of China (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1969). Freedman, Maurice, Chinese Lineage and Society (London: The Athlone, 
1966). 
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entation and achievement. If the people of An-hwei practiced Con-
fucianism as precise as it was presented in the text which condemned 
commercial business as evil, there would not be any so-called An-hwei 
Businessmen in China's economic history. 
One of the main arguments in Weber's Religion of China is that 
there was no tension found in the traditional value system. He said 
[There were] no tensions between nature and deity, between 
ethical demand and human shortcoming, consciousness of 
sin and need for salvation, conduct on earth and compensa-
tion in the beyond, religious duty and socio-political reality. 
Hence, there was no leverage for influencing conduct 
through inner forces freed of tradition and convention. 12 
Here again, we saw that Weber took for granted that Confucianism 
played the sole role in traditional Chinese society. Weber failed to 
take into account the significant impact of Taoism on the Chinese 
masses. As a school of philosophy, Taoism did represent one of the 
most conservative schools of thought in the traditional Chinese philo-
sophical system. But as a religious sect, it was one of the most pro-
gressive and rebellious groups in Chinese history. History shows that 
revolutions and rebellions initiated by Taoists and their followers were 
frequently observed in several of the Chinese dynasties. In fact, Tao-
ism was the religion of the Chinese mass peasantry. To say that Tao-
ism is conservative, therefore, is to misunderstand its great potential 
for progressive change, which was often reflected in the Chinese peas-
antry, certainly the majority group of the Chinese population. To 
completely ignore the popularity of Taoism as Weber did is 
unforgivable. 
In short, Weber's contribution on the analysis of Chinese social 
structure is overshadowed by his preoccupation in attempting to prove 
that the condition in traditional China was unfavorable to the develop-
ment of rational capitalism. 
Another similar theoretical argument on the relationship between 
religious belief and modernization in China is found in Robert N. Bel-
lah's Tokugawa Religion, which is designed to apply Weber's theory of 
industrialization to the Japanese case. 
Although Bellah does not deal with Chinese religious belief di-
rectly in his Tokugawa Religion, he often cites Chinese examples for 
comparison with the Japanese experience. He notes: 
At many points in this study implicit or explicit comparisons 
12. Weber, Religion of China, supra note 6, pp. 235-236. 
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with China have been made. This has usually been 
prompted by the fact that so much of the cultural and reli-
gious tradition is common to both, whereas the process of 
modernization took such a different course in China and Ja-
pan. We have usually attempted, whatever this subject has 
come up, to use the basic value systems of the two societies 
as a primary reference point in explaining the difference. 13 
The basic difference between China and Japan, according to Bel-
lah is that "China was characterized by the primacy of integrative 
value whereas Japan was characterized by primacy of political or goal-
attainment value." The integrative value in China thus are more con-
cerned with system maintenance than with goal-attainment or adapta-
tion, more with solidarity than with power or wealth. The human 
relations in China, in other words, is more concerned with particular-
istic ties than with universalistic attributes. 
The Chinese saw the problem of system maintenance, according 
to Bellah, "in terms of a determinate set of human relations that only 
needed to be kept in a state of mutual adjustment for a harmonious 
and balanced social system to result. An adjusted equilibrium is in-
deed the ideal of Chinese society." 14 Thus, the value of filial piety 
clearly superseded political loyalty. Even the political loyalty existing 
in traditional China was strongly "familistic." In short, Bellah argues, 
the traditional Chinese polity was not constructed for progressive 
change or goal-attainment, but for system maintenance. 
Bellah concludes, therefore, the Chinese ethic lacks the dyna-
mism which would overcome the traditionalism of the masses and 
transfer the primacy allegiance from the family to some larger collec-
tivity. The rationalism inherent in the Confucian ethic seems to need 
to be linked with a value system in which political values have pri-
macy if it is to have an influence in the direction of modernization. 
From the above summary of Bellah's arguments, we can see he is 
under the great shadow of Weber, even though he did try to use a 
different language to describe it. For Bellah, the system maintenance 
of integration in Chinese society is responsible for the lack of goal-
attainment or developmental motivation; whereas for Weber, it is the 
Confucian doctrine of nature harmony and integration that is respon-
sible for the failure of the development of capitalist economy. The 
main difference between Bellah and Weber lies in the fact that Bellah 
tried to focus his study on the religious tradition in the lives of "ordi-
13. Bellah, Tokuguwa Religion, supra note 3, p. 188. 
14. Ibid., p. 189. 
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nary people," while Weber was more concerned with Confucian ideol-
ogy. It seems to me, then, Bellah's approach is much closer to the true 
picture of Chinese daily life than Weber, for the reason we mentioned 
earlier. 
The main problem in Bellah's comparison of Japan and China is 
that he seems to ignore the diversity of religious traditions among or-
dinary Chinese people. For it is evident that Japan's small population 
of "ordinary people" is much more harmonious ideologically and re-
ligiously than their Chinese counterpart. As we mentioned before, 
many different local cultures existed in China, and it is impossible to 
consider the Chinese "ordinary people" as a homogenous group. 
In methodology, Bellah also falls into the Weber's trap. Like 
Weber, Bellah attempts to show that China lacked the ability of devel-
oping a rational economy which was contrast in Japan. It is quite 
apparent that Japan is merely a substitute for Weber's West in Bellah's 
work. In reading Takugawa Religion, there is a strong mixture of 
Weberian theory and Parsonian language in it. 
2. Chinese Family Structure and Modernization 
Marion J. Levy, Jr. has developed an interesting theory on the 
inability of Chinese social structure for the development of moderniza-
tion by looking into the role of the traditional family in China. Levy 
suggested that the Chinese modernization might fail because of the 
Chinese family's inability to change its inner structure to promote 
change. Levy constructed a comparison between Chinese and Japa-
nese families in an attempt to emphasize the Chinese shortcoming in 
this particular respect. 
Levy saw the major differences between Chinese and Japanese 
family structures that are relevant for modernization as (1) how family 
considerations enter the total social picture, (2) the fact that there was 
no single ideal type of family in Japan, and (3) the emphasis on primo-
geniture in Japan. 15 
The first of these main differences referred to the mechanism of 
social integration, Levy said: 
In Japan the family certainly occupied a position of strategic 
importance, but it was definitely subordinated to other con-
siderations in the society. This created in the society a possi-
bility overriding or manipulating various aspects of the 
15. Marion J. Levy, Jr., "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of Japan and 
China," inS. Kuznets et al., eds., Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan (Durham, N.C.: 
Duke University Press, 1955), pp. 495-536. 
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family patterns for other purposes. In China this possibility 
of manipulating family patterns in terms of other aspects of 
the society was much more limited because the family struc-
ture of China was too a much greater degree the major focus 
of the society than was the case in Japan. 16 
One distinctive example is that, in Japan, loyalty to the feudal hierar-
chy took clear precedence over loyalty to one's family. Every man's 
first duty in Japan was to his overlord while the family came second. 
In China, on the contrary, nothing is more important than one's own 
family. 
The second of the differences between the Chinese and Japanese 
family structures in relation to modernization turns on the marked 
differences in class structures in the two societies. In theory, China 
could be seen to have an open class system while in Japan the class 
system was almost closed. This contrast was reflected in the status of 
the merchants in these two societies. According to Levy, then, the 
Chinese merchants held roles of extremely low prestige because the 
open class system allowed the children of the merchants to move up 
into the official bureaucracy, either through such formal channels as 
examinations or through such informal channels as capital donations 
or bribes. The ideal and highest goal of the upward mobility in China 
was service in the official bureaucracy; wealth was one way to move 
into this bureaucracy. Consequently, the status of merchants became 
a "transitory status" for those who failed in examination but whose 
goal was still to go to the official bureaucracyY 
In Japan, Levy argued, the picture was completely different. The 
closed class system inhibited any movement from the bottom to the 
top, and thus, preserved the continuity of the status of merchants. 
Levy said that "one was born to the social position of one's parents. It 
was expected that one stay in it as well." 18 No matter how rich a man 
was, he and his descendants still remained in the same social status. 
Thus, the Japanese merchants did not have any motivation or incen-
tive to move up into the feudal hierarchy in this closed class system. 
They remained as merchants and worked hard to preserve thereby the 
welfare of their family. This group of Japanese merchants then be-
came an important factor in that country's economic development. 
The third of the differences lies in the fact that the Japanese fam-
ily instituted a sort of business civil service within their own compa-
16. Ibid., p. 531. 
.17. Ibid., pp. 514-516. 
18. Ibid., p. 516. 
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nies, and those men most successful in the business competition and 
destined to become major figures in the various enterprises of the fam-
ily more frequently brought into the family membership. The role of 
equal inheritance on the part of all sons that held in China was not 
practiced in Japan, nor did the oldest sons always succeed to the fam-
ily property or rights. Levy said that "he [the oldest son] could be, 
and sometimes was, replaced by someone adopted as an oldest son, or 
he could even be replaced by a younger one. . . . This made possible at 
one and the same time the continued concentration of wealth in a sin-
gle family line and the creation of a cadet class." 19 
The immediate consequence of such a system of adoption-related 
modernization is that economic capital could be easily passed from 
one generation to another within a single family. This also means that 
family wealth can be more effectively utilized in large-scale industrial 
investment, and the criteria of adoption, in terms of universalistic 
competence, may encourage an effective and successful business 
operation. 
Although it may very well be true that the Chinese family was 
responsible for the failure of the development of Chinese moderniza-
tion, as Levy has suggested. The three major contrasting factors are, it 
seems to me, not very likely to be the most crucial ones in the different 
processes of modernization experienced by China and Japan. There 
are several problems in levy's theoretical arguments. 
First, there is some evidence that the Chinese can develop a suc-
cessful enterpreneur society under the traditional family structure. 
Studies on the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia have clearly demon-
strated this to be true. 20 
Second, the argument on the class structures in Japan and China 
is a strange one, for mobility is often regarded as the necessary condi-
tion to develop a capitalist system. As a matter of fact, economic 
growth and development can hardly sustain without a free occupa-
tional mobility. In addition, I also find other reasons to question 
Levy's argument here. First, in a closed-class system like Japan's, 
there certainly was no motivation for upward mobility into a higher 
social class. A merchant is always a merchant under this system. 
Thus, is he expected to work hard all his life for nothing but wealth? 
Second, in a society as isolated as Japan's was in the pre-industrial 
period, the majority of the population would be peasants while the size 
19. Ibid., p. 517. 
20. W.G. Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 1957). 
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of the merchant class was likely to be small. Then, how could the 
merchants inspire the peasants to join their revolt against the existing 
system, if they themselves had no chance to move up? Even Weber 
agreed, as we mentioned earlier, China, in comparison with Japan, 
probably had a better chance to develop its socio-economic moderni-
zation than Japan insofar as the class structures are concerned. 
As mentioned earlier, Levy also argued that the role of the Chi-
nese merchant is merely a transitory one because his ultimate goal is in 
the official bureaucracy. Levy claimed that such an open-class system 
encouraged the talented people to go to the official bureaucracy in-
stead of staying in the merchant class, and by emphasizing the high 
value of the bureaucracy, therefore, has undoubtedly hurt the develop-
ment of an entrepreneur class in China. But I do not believe this lack 
of an enterpreneur class development was due to the result of the re-
cruitment process of the bureaurcracy through which government re-
cruited all the talented men while leaving only the less intelligent in 
the business world, as Levy strongly suggested. Rather, it seems to 
me, it is because the tremendous investment in both human energy 
and capital, which could otherwise be used in socioeconomic develop-
ment went into the preparation for the examination that handicapped 
the business and other commercial developments. Very often, as sto-
ries told by history, ten years, or even one's whole life, could be and 
was spent in this important endeavor in traditional China in the hope 
that someday he would pass the examinations. 
In regard to the third difference, one important question Levy 
leaves unanswered is what percentage of merchants in Japan practiced 
the idea of adoption? In other words, how many merchants in Japan 
actually adopted a capable business partner or co-worker from outside 
the family to succeed them in the business and replace their own sons 
in the family? Was this only a possible "ideal" or was it really prac-
ticed in most of the great Japanese merchant families? Levy did not 
provide any empirical evidence to support his argument. 
In short, what may be the contrasting characteristics between the 
japanese and the Chinese family structures may not be the "contrast-
ing factors" at all in modernization processes experienced differently 
by these two societies. Moreover, Levy never gave us any explicit ra-
tionale or justification for his selection of the points he compared. 
3. Chinese Political Structure and Modernization 
Three major works in this field will be discussed here. They are: 
Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 
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S.N. Eisenstadt's The Political Systems of Empires, and Lucian W. 
Pye's The Spirit of Chinese Politics. 
Moore's main theoretical argument regarding China's failure to 
modernize is focused on the political implication of social structures in 
that country. First, according to Moore, large numbers of lower-de-
gree candidates at the bottom of the official Chinese system of ranking 
dissipated their energy in fruitless revolt and insurrection within the 
prevailing framework. Conversely, the lower ranks of the Japanese 
samurai provided much of the impetus toward modernization during 
the 19th century.21 
Second, according to Moore, the imperial Chinese society never 
created an urban trading and manufacturing class comparable to the 
one that grew out of the latter stages of feudalism in Western Europe. 
Since the Chinese believed that money-making activities represented a 
dangerous threat to the scholar-official's image and legitimacy, the 
government was very careful not to allow such activities to get out of 
control. Thus, they taxed commerce for their own gain, or they 
turned business into state monopoly and kept the most lucrative posi-
tions for themselves. 
Third, according to Moore, the Chinese government was too 
weak to have any national industrialization program because most of 
the commercial and industrial elements were foreign and largely be-
yond its control in the late 19th century. Further, any attempt to use 
modern technology was made by the powerful local provincial gentry 
for their own separatist purpose. 
Fourth, Moore indicated, there was no independent ideology of 
the Chinese middle class in the nineteenth century. 
Finally, China failed to adopt a commercial agriculture; the Chi-
nese landowner showed no enthusiasm for improving production 
methods for the sake of the urban market. And because of this, Moore 
argued, the Chinese peasantry in the first half of this century turned 
against the urban-middle class oriented Nationalist government while 
giving their support to the Chinese Communists. 
The main issue in Eisenstadt's study of the processes of change in 
Chinese society is that the condition necessary for the development of 
extensive marginal and total changed did not exist in traditional 
China. The principle type of change that dominated China's long his-
tory was, according to him, "accomodable change." He said: 
China presents a good example of a society in which 
processes of accommodable change occurred and of the con-
21. Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, supra note 5, pp. 162-177. 
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crete conditions under which they tend to develop. In 
China, throughout many centuries (until the end of the nine-
teenth century and the meeting with the West), accommod-
able and marginal (rebellious and dynastic) changes 
constituted the principal types of change. On the other 
hand, all the marginal types of change either evaporated or 
merged in the processes of accommodable change, becoming 
reintegrated into the basic framework of the political 
institutions. 22 
Processes of accommodable change were connected with the so-
cial condition that made possible the continuous fundamental har-
mony in traditional Chinese polity. Conflicts among different political 
groups were often regulated through the existing norms and activities 
of the major political and regulative institutions of the society. 
Eisenstadt argued that three vital tendencies capable of under-
mining the existing institutional framework never fully developed in 
traditional China: (a) the potential trend toward feudalization as pat-
rimonial decentralization which was often blocked by the gentry and 
the older aristocracy; (b) the tendency toward complete independence 
of the urban merchant and professional groups; and (c) the trend to-
ward development of activistic, universalistic, religious and cultural 
orientations. He then concluded that failure to develop these three 
great tendencies made the later modernization attempt more 
difficult. 23 
The third major work on Chinese political institution and mod-
ernization is Lucian W. Pye's The Spirit of Chinese Politics. His cen-
tral argument is that there was an authority crisis in Chinese politics 
in particular and in society generally. The lack of a national identity 
and of effective norms of authority made it difficult for the Chinese to 
move toward successful development and modernization. Pye said 
that "basic problem in development for the Chinese has been that of 
achieving within their social and political life few forms of authority 
which can both satisfy their need to reassert a historic self-confidence 
and also provide the basis for re-ordering their society in modern 
terms."24 
Thus, Pye concluded that it was impossible for the Chinese gov-
ernment to advance national political development, because they could 
not meet the essential requirements to penetrate more thoroughly into 
22. S.N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (N.Y.: Free Press, 1963), p. 323. 
23. Ibid., pp. 325-326. 
24. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics, supra note 4, p. 5. 
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the society and mobilizing human and material resources more exten-
sively than had been possible in the traditional system, so long as the 
Chinese were experiencing such an authority crisis. 
We found there were two main issues in the three studies just 
summarized. Moore and Eisenstadt all focus on the lack of dynamic 
oriented change inherent in traditional Chinese social and political 
structures which then made any contemporary progressive change im-
possible. Pye emphasized the special importance of the authority cri-
sis after contact with the West in the transitional period. In turn, Pye 
argued, such an authority crisis made the government unable to ad-
vance any political and economic developments of their own. Since 
political modernization is now generally regarded as the most urgent 
task in the whole process of modernization in the non-Western socie-
ties the studies on Chinese political structure in relation to moderniza-
tion is, therefore, greatly welcomed. 
The theoretical arguments found in Moore and Eisenstadt's re-
spective work did not really go any farther than Weber's work which 
we mentioned earlier. What Moore and Eisenstadt really achieved, if 
any, is their attempts to narrow their focuses particularly to political 
and legal systems in traditional China, while Weber looked at a much 
general level of value system in traditional China. 
There are some difficulties in Eisenstadt's theory of "accommod-
able change" of traditional Chinese society. First of all, he did not 
give us any satisfactory reason why accommodable change existed 
only in China, not other societies; he simply said that the pressure of 
integrative harmony was too strong for any total change in social and 
political structures to occur in China. Secondly, he also did not show 
us how China could maintain integration for such a long time or if 
there was any significant structural feature in the Chinese political sys-
tem that contributed to such an integration in traditional China. 
Sociologically, for the purpose of studying change and moderni-
zation, it seems to me, it would be very interesting to find out how 
China was able to avoid total change during her long history. In other 
words, what mechanisms were used in China to sustain its political 
and social systems functionally intact? For instance, the bureaucratic 
system of recruitment can be seen as a system-maintenance mecha-
nism against total change in society. By requiring a complete memo-
rizing of Confucian Classics without argument or question, the 
government was able to indoctrinate the traditional norms and ideol-
ogy into every potential government official as the only line of thinking 
and way of doing things. Similarly, the strict practice of Confucian 
ideology, which was required for the promotion and upward mobility 
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within the official bureaucracy, also contributed to political integration 
in traditional China. They reduced the possible change of any deviant 
thought and behavior, and thus, revolution, among political leaders in 
the traditional Chinese society. 
In general, I would agree with Pye's main argument of the crisis 
of authority responsible for the government's inability to mobilize 
China's resources for modernization. But his "identity crisis" bothers 
me. I do not believe the Chinese have ever doubted who they were 
during this period of social and political crisis in the 19th and 20th 
centuries. For the majority of Chinese, it was a question of Chinese 
against foreigners, not the Chinese against the Chinese. To them, the 
Manchu rulers and Westerners were both foreigners. Being against 
the Manchu government did not mean being against the Chinese 
themselves. 25 
The authority crisis emanating from such a political struggle re-
sulted in the failure of the Chinese themselves to establish an efficient 
centralized government to deal with the challenge from the West. For 
instance, the revolutionary party of Dr. Sun Yat-sen before 1911 never 
admitted that the Manchus were Chinese. The party leaders believed 
that the Manchus were foreigners and barbarians and that they were 
responsible for the failure of system-maintenance and for the failure of 
creating an effective coping mechanism to deal with these crises. In 
fact, the leaders were convinced that they could solve the crisis situa-
tion themselves because they, as true Chinese, knew and understood 
the problems much better than the Manchu rulers. Thus, it is very 
unlikely that crisis in China resulted from the national identity crisis, 
as Pye has suggested. 
On the contrary, the problems in China at that time were quite 
similar to those in other colonial societies-the problem of standing 
against colonial rulers, the problem of national independence, and so 
forth. Following this line of argument, one question might be of inter-
est: why did the authority crisis not disappear in China after the suc-
cessful revolution in 1911? One possible way to study this problem, it 
seems to me, is to analyze the ideological and political backgrounds of 
the Chinese political modernization leadership in the post-1911 pe-
riod. It is evident that conflicts between traditional and modernization 
political leaders created a tremendous impediment to a smooth and 
well-planned social and political transformation in China. Nowhere 
25. Wen-hui Tsai, Patterns of Political Elite Mobility in Modern China, 1912-1949 
(Hong Kong: Chinese Materials Center, 1983). 
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does Pye make a serious attempt to analyze China in terms of a theory 
that applied to transitional societies as a whole. 
More serious is the methodology upon which Pye develops his 
theoretical generalization. Although what he has said may very well 
be true, he offers no assurance of validity beyond his own expertise in 
the field; no empirical work is presented. The basis of his whole argu-
ment, as a matter of fact, was his own personal experience of growing 
up in China. He also claimed that in this psychological oriented study 
of political culture, he did not need to be concerned with questions 
about the actual distribution of attitude and feelings throughout the 
Chinese population. The personal bias inherent in this work is most 
unfortunate. 
4. External Factors in Chinese Modernization 
Although most studies have generally agreed that the Chinese 
contacts with the West have had a significant impact on the process of 
Chinese modernization, very few systematic studies have been done in 
this respect. In fact, Western scholars seem very reluctant to admit 
that Western political economic, and military interference in the nine-
teenth century created a tremendously difficult situation for the Chi-
nese to work on their developmental projects independently from the 
West. 
Most of these cholars26 argue that the contacts with the West 
should have given China an advantageous opportunity from the West, 
but China failed to do so. For instance, Levy argued that China would 
have had an even better chance than Japan, because the Western coun-
tries had invested more capital in China than in Japan, and therefore, 
China should have been able to utilize more Western capital in its 
investment on modernization, as compared with Japan.27 
Both Levy and other scholars who took the same stand with him 
failed to realize the fact that Chinese economic programs in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries were under a great restriction from the 
West because of the Chinese economic dependence on the West. His-
torical evidence can be found that on several occasions Chinese devel-
opmental plans were rejected by the Western money-lenders whenever 
those plans were in conflict with the latter's. The Chinese had almost 
no freedom to do anything without permission from the West. Francis 
26. E.g., Marion J. Levy, Jr., Modernization and the Structure of Societies (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970). John K. Fairbank and Ssu-yu Teng, eds., China's 
Response to the West (N.Y.: Atheum Press, 1963). 
27. Levy, Modernization and the Structure of Societies, supra note 26. 
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L.K. Hsu once said it sadly: "Since the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury China has never had the freedom of pondering its own way and 
moving at its own pace."28 
A similar viewpoint was expressed in Frances V. Moulder's com-
parison of modernization between Japan and China. Moulder sees 
that .there was no strong effort by the Western nations in the 19th 
century to incorporate Japan's dependencies because of its small mar-
ket for trade and investment which enabled Japan to develop its own 
strategies for development. But in China, the Western capitalist na-
tions developed a large staple trade with China and the assumption of 
the power of China's government which led to the dismantling of the 
already weak imperial state. As a result, according to Moulder, Japan 
enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy in its development, while 
China's dependency on the Western nations undermined its efforts in 
modernization in the 19th century.29 
It is certainly very naive to blame either the West or the Chinese 
alone for the failure of China's modernization, even though the exter-
nal forces in China at that time were very crucial. What is needed is a 
systematic analysis of both the advantages and disadvantages of the 
western impact on China, institutionally as well as psychologically. 
In summary, our review of the western theories of Chinese mod-
ernization has found that most studies and theories on this subject 
tend to be fragmentary as well as narrow-minded, for too much em-
phasis is often put on a certain limited aspect of the Chinese social 
structure while ignoring all the others. Weber's study of Chinese 
traditional religion, Bellah's examination of traditional value system, 
Levy's work on the role and functions of the family, the respective 
works of Eisenstadt, Pye, and Moore on the Chinese political system, 
and Moulder's analysis of foreign external forces in China all pose a 
common problem that they are too narrow in scope to be able to ex-
plain the complexity of the Chinese modernization process. More-
over, all the above mentioned theories are developed by western 
scholars who are not personally involved in China's modernization ex-
perience. In the next section, we shall turn to the various competing 
views offered by Chinese intellectuals on the fate of Chinese 
modernization. 
28. Francis L.K. Hsu, Under the Ancestors' Shadow (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 
1967), p. X. 
29. Frances V. Moulder, Japan, China and the Modern World Economy (N.Y. Cam-
bridge University Press, 1979) pp. 200-201. 
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III. CHINESE VIEWS ON MODERNIZATION EFFORT 
The idea of change and reform has been discussed among Chinese 
intellectuals ever since the mid-19th century, and yet, according to 
Fairbank and Teng, "the process of ideological change in modern 
China had to begin with the reinterpretation of the Chinese heritage, 
rather than with its denial and rejection."30 Shocked by domestic re-
bellions and foreign invasions, the Chinese scholar-officials suddenly 
realized the possibility of the fall of the Empire and the necessity of 
searching for a proper path to a strong new China. The radicals were 
for jettisoning the whole traditional system, while the conservatives 
clung to their hope of a Confucian revival. The radicals were very few 
in number, whereas the conservatives were the great majority of Chi-
nese intellectuals and, more importantly, were strongly sympathized 
with by the Imperial Court in the mid-nineteenth century. The 1860s 
T'ung-Chih Restoration was one of the great attempts of the conserva-
tives. The great aim of the T'ung-Chih Restoration was the revival of 
Confucian values and institutions which the conservatives regarded as 
superior to the western barbarian values and institutions, and which 
could stabilize popular sentiment and integrate the great Chinese na-
tion. Led by T'seng Kuo-fan the Chinese conservatives re-examined 
Confucian values and institutions in great detail in order to recreate a 
modified theory which could be fit into Chinese social and political 
situations at the time. The program of the restoration involved fi-
nance, the civil service, law, and ethical morality, as well as foreign 
policy. 
The assumption in such a self-examination of the traditional Con-
fucian theory was that peace and stability could be achieved through 
the restoration of the traditional heritage. The Chinese conservatives 
were convinced that Chinese history during the past three thousand 
years has shown several successful reforms through such a "return to 
the old way." However, the Chinese conservatives in the mid-nine-
teenth century failed to realize the complexity of the social and polit-
ical situations in relation to the internal unrest and foreign 
aggressions. The traditional theory of a cyclical change was not only 
invalid for the modern period, but also complete inadequate; progress 
forward now must be taken into consideration. It is not enough 
merely to restore the best of the ancient Chinese values and institu-
tions but it is necessary to have a far-reaching plan of modernization 
in which China may find a place in the large universe. The lack of 
such a foundation made the failure of the "T'ung-Chih Restoration" 
30. Fairbank and Teng., eds., China's Response to the West. supra note 26, p. 7. 
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movement inevitable. Wright said, "The country became weaker than 
stronger: sycophants filled the posts lately held by the great Restora-
tion statement; and the successful foreign policy of the sixties gave 
way to an era of ever more humiliating treaties, loss ofterritory, and-
in all but name-loss of sovereignty itself."31 
The ideological consequence of the failure of the "T'ung-Chih 
Restoration" is apparent: the conservatives lost their confidence on 
the old theory, whereas the radicals sought revolution as the only solu-
tion to save China. Although there were several attempts toward a 
smooth reform in the late-nineteenth century and early twentieth cen-
tury, the revolution finally broke out in October 1911. Dr. Sun Yat-
san and his revolutionary group overthrew the old Manchus Empire 
and established a new Republic, the first in China's long history. 
The Chinese modernizing elite, those foreign educated Chinese 
young intellectuals in particular, were quite understandably enthusias-
tic about the success of the Republican revolution and saw it as the 
beginning of a new era in China's return to world respectability. Un-
fortunately, their dream of a stronger and better China soon became a 
nightmare as China after the revolution fell into the hands of a group 
of warlords with endless civil wars while the threat of a Japanese dom-
inance endangering China's independence became more and more real 
and unbearable. The fate of China's future thus became the central 
focus of a furious debate among the Chinese intellectuals in the post-
revolutionary China. 
The currents of Chinese ideological thought in the post-1912 pe-
riod are too complicated to be easily classified. For the purpose of our 
discussion here we may classify the Chinese intellectuals of the period 
into two major groups: the modernizing elite and the traditional elite. 
The Modernizing elite are those reformers who attempt to adopt west-
ern values and institutions into Chinese society in order to establish a 
new modern China. Within this group of modernizing elite, it is also 
necessary to differentiate the liberals who prefer the gradual transfor-
mation of Chinese modernization through education and other peace-
ful methods, and the leftists who are communists and/or socialists in 
favor of radical political action to achieve the goal of modernization in 
China. 
The Confucians were the other major group of Chinese intellectu-
als in the post-1912 period. These traditional elite insisted that the 
traditional Confucian values and institutions were superior and thus 
31. Mary L. Wright, The Last Stand a/Chinese Conservatism (N.Y.: Atheum, 1967), 
p. 299. 
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must be preserved in China; they believed that China can be a strong 
nation based on a rebuilt Confucian theory. Some of the traditional 
elite even declared that someday the Confucian theory will regain its 
glory in the world when the Western materialistic civilization 
collapses. 
It is certainly significant to note here, nevertheless, that many 
Chinese leaders of the period at one time or another had a foot in 
either group. And events have moved so rapidly in twentiety-century 
China that by clinging to certain views a radical might find himself 
soon grown conservative. 
1. Hu Shih and the Modernizing Elite 
The central figure in the modernizing elite at the early Republi-
can period after the 1911 revolution was Dr. Hu Shih, an American 
educated professor of philosophy at Peking University. Hu Shih ar-
gued the current crisis in modern Chinese society is mainly the result 
of the great mistake made by traditional Confucianism. He attacked 
the Chinese worship of meaning, the filial piety symbolism, and Con-
fucian classical education as not fitting into the present-day Chinese 
society. 
For Hu Shih, civilization is an evolutionary process of imitation. 
"The greatest period of a race is the period of imitating others." Hu 
said, "When a race does not learn from others, the race is going to 
decline. The greatest age of China were the periods in which we sin-
cerely tried to learn from the others. The great capacity for imitation 
in the Japanese race has made Japan a great nation. On the other 
hand, Chinese traditions do not fit into present-day society at all. 
There is no other way to save China from destruction than to imitate 
others ... We have to learn from others with whole heart. We have 
to imitate them. We have to learn how to educate people to kick out 
our stupidity, how to operate machines to conquer nature for human 
happiness, and how to establish efficient systems for business, indus-
try, and even politics."32 
Hu Shih argued that the civilization of a race is simply the sum-
total of its achievement in adjusting itself to its environment. Success 
or failure in that adjustment depends upon the ability of the race to 
use intelligence for the invention of necessary effective tools. Ad-
vancement in civilization depends upon the improvement of tools. 
Thus, the difference between Eastern and Western civilizations is pri-
32. Shih Hu, Collected Essays of Hu Shih (Taipei: Commercial Books, 1953), vol. 3, p. 
23. 
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marily a difference in the tools used. He said, "Every tool of civiliza-
tion is produced by human intelligence making use of the matter and 
energy in the natural world for the satisfaction of a want, a desire, an 
aesthetic feeling or an intellectual curiosity." And, "there is no such 
thing as a purely material civilization. " 33 
The material civilization and spiritual civilization are not two 
contradictory concepts, they are in fact the two manifestations of 
human civilization, we do not merely mean the physical object but 
also the human intelligence used in its creation. Hu Shih deeply be-
lieved that the spiritual civilization must be built on the foundation of 
material progress. As a matter of fact, no spiritual civilization can be 
achieved without the satisfaction of material civilization. He said, 
"The great tragedy of our human world is that many people worked 
hard all their lives without achieving a minimal human happiness."34 
He asked, "What spiritualism is there in a civilization which tolerates 
such a terrible form of human slavery as the rickshaw coolie? Do we 
seriously believe that there can be any spiritual life left in those poor 
human beasts of burden who run and toil and sweat under that pecu-
liar bondage of slavery which knews neither the minimum wage nor 
any limit of working hours?"35 And, thus, he argued that "there is not 
much spirituality in a civilization which bound the feet of its women 
for almost a thousand years without a protest, nor in that other civili-
zations (India) which long tolerated the practice of suttee or cremation 
of widows and has maintained the horrible caste-system to this day."36 
According to Hu Shih, modern Western civilization is built on 
the following concepts: (a) The purpose of human life is to .search for 
happiness, (b) thus, poverty is a sin, and (c) thus, illness is a sin. He 
said, "It is because poverty is a sin that men have to develop natural 
resources, to encourage production, to improve manufacture, and to 
improve human heredity. And finally, it is because the purpose of 
human life is to search for happiness that we want to have a comforta-
ble living, a convenient transportation, a clean city, beautiful arts, a 
safe society, and good politics."37 Therefore, he said, there is no doubt 
that "modern technology is highly spiritual because it seeks, through 
33. Shih Hu, "The Civilizations of the East and the West," in C.A. Beard, ed., Whither 
Mankind (N.Y.: Longmans, Green & Co., 1928), pp. 25-27. 
34. Shih Hu, Hu Shih and the Sino-Western Cultures (Taipei: Waterbaffalo Publisher, 
1967), p. 55. 
35. Hu, "The Civilizations of the East and the West," supra note 33, pp. 28-29. 
36. Ibid., p. 40. 
37. Shih Hu, The Diary of Hu Shih's Studies in the Abroad (Taipei: Far East Books, 
1959), p. 56. 
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human ingenuity and intelligence, to release human energy from the 
unnecessary hardships of life and provide for it the necessary condi-
tions for the enjoyment of life. Whatever by the use men may make of 
the resultant comfort and leisure, the relief of suffering and hardship is 
in itself spiritual."38 
Another characteristic of modern Western civilization is science. 
The spirit of science is to search for truth. It is truth that can release 
the human being from environmental, cultural, and superstitious suf-
ferings to become a strong, intelligent, and free man. Hu Shih pointed 
out that "it was science and the new technology which restored to man 
the sense of self-confidence and created the modern civilization of the 
West . . . . A whole recognition of the material satisfaction is one of 
the significant characteristics in modern Western civilization. " 39 And 
"if the priests of the Medieval Age were justly canonized as saints, 
Galileo, Watt, Stephenson, Morse, Bell, Edison, and Ford certainly 
deserve to be honored as gods and enshrined with Prometheus and 
Cadmus. They represent that which is most divine in man, namely, 
that creative intelligence which provides implements and makes civili-
zation possible."40 
The spirit of science also relies on its skepticism. Science teaches 
us not to despair of the infinity of knowledge for it is only through 
piecemeal accumulation of fragmentary information that we can hope 
to arrive at some knowledge of nature at all. Every piecemeal acquisi-
tion is progress, and every little step in advance gives the worker a 
genuinely spiritual rapture. Hu Shih said, "The most spiritual element 
in science is its skepticism, its courage to doubt everything and believe 
nothing without sufficient evidence. This attitude is not merely nega-
tive, although on the negative side it has performed very great service 
in liberating the human mind from slavish subjection to superstition 
and authority. The attitude of doubt is essentially constructive and 
creative: it is the only legitimate road to belief; it aims at conquering 
doubt itself and establishing belief on a new basis. It has not only 
fought the old belief with the irresistible weapon, 'Give me evidence,' 
but also raised new problems and led to new discoveries by the same 
insistence on evidence."41 For Hu Shih, it is this spirit of "creative 
doubt" which has made progress of science and the greatness of mod-
ern Western civilization. 
38. Hu, "The Civilizations of the East and the West," supra note 33, p. 34. 
39. Shih Hu, The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China (Taipei: 
Academia Sinica, 1969), p. 56. 
40. Hu, "The Civilizations of the East and the West," supra note 33, p. 27. 
41. Ibid., p. 37. 
24 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
One significant consequence of the great achievement in science 
in Western civilization is the emergence of a new religion which Hu 
Shih called "The Religion of Democracy." He said, "Modern civiliza-
tion did not begin with religion, but it has resulted in a new religion; it 
did not much trouble about morals, but it has achieved a new system 
of morals."42 The basic idea of this modern religion is, Hu Shih said, 
that "we trust man rather than Heaven; we depend on ourselves rather 
than God; we do not want to imagine what is the Heaven, we want to 
build a human paradise in this world; we do not want to become an 
eternal deity, we want to be a happy and healthy man in this world; we 
do not want to think about religious philosophy, we want to be an 
intelligent man to improve this world; we will not easily believe God's 
ability, but we do believe in the capacity of scientific techniques and 
the future of our human being is not limited; we will not believe the 
eternity of soul but we will believe the greatness of human character 
and of human right."43 
The development of the religion of democracy has its historical 
significance. The Industrial Revolution opened up the possibility of 
the emergence of such a religion. Hu said, "With the increase in mate-
rial enjoyment and the rise of a large middle class, there has been si-
multaneously an expansion in man's imaginative power and sympathy. 
And with the restoration of man's confidence in himself as the agent to 
control his own destinies, there have developed the various types of 
social consciousness and social virtues. All this leads to the rise of the 
new religion of democracy, by which I mean to include the individual-
istic ideals of the eighteenth century and the socialistic ideals of the 
last hundred years."44 The ideals of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, 
which were widely spread in the European continent, he said, "have 
become the war-cry of the American Revolution, the French revolu-
tion, and the revolution of 1848, and have vibrated through all the 
later revolutions. "45 
The ideals of the religion of democracy have worked themselves 
into the constitutions of the new republics. They have brought about 
the downfall of monarchies, empires, and aristocracies. They have 
given to man equality before the law and freedom of thought, speech, 
publication, and religious belief. And they have emancipated the wo-
men and made universal education a reality. Hu said, "This religion 
of democracy which not only guarantees one's own liberty ... but also 
42. Ibid., p. 37. 
43. Hu, Collected Essays of Hu Shih, vol. 3, supra note 32, p. 10. 
• 44. Hu, "The Civilizations of the East and the West," supra note 33, p. 38. 
45. Ibid., p. 38. 
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endeavors to make it possible for every man and woman to live a free 
life; which not only succeeds through science and machinery in greatly 
enhancing the happiness and comfort of the individual, but also seeks 
through organization and legislation to extend the goods of life to the 
greatest number-this is the greatest spiritual heritage of the Western 
civilization. "46 
Hu Shih made very clear the need of a psychological prerequisite 
in the process of Chinese modernization. He said, "Today if we are 
going to try investigate how to solve the problems of Chinese society, 
we have to reexamine our attitude towards these problems first .... 
We should reexamine ourselves: why did we fail? why is our national 
salvation movement still a failure today? There are still many people 
who do not believe our nation and race are sick. . . . Others do not try 
hard to cure our sickness."47 The self-examination of Chinese tradi-
tions, according to Hu Shih, does not only require a new mentality but 
also a recognition of all the mistakes the Chinese have made, "There 
were several major events in recent Chinese history such as the Sino-
Japan War in 1894, the Russian occupation of Li Hsung Harbor, the 
Boxer incident, etc., we reacted to these incidents strongly each time, 
but we have never achieved our goal to save China."48 
It is, therefore, the duty of the leaders, especially political leaders, 
to show what the problems are and how to solve them. Hu Shih said, 
"Often we do not think seriously what kind of society and nation we 
want to have, and often we are also not willing to think about the 
direction which can lead us to reach the destination. Consequently, if 
somebody says left, we go left; others say right, we go right. If our 
leaders have great experience in world affairs, and if our leaders lead 
us with their eyes open, we may be able to reach the destination by 
following them. However, if they are blind, then we will be in great 
danger."49 
History has told us that Chinese political leaders have failed to 
direct us to build a better nation. People also have lost their faith too. 
It is now the responsibility of Chinese modem intellectuals to take 
over the leadership and to call attention to the mistake made by those 
political leaders. Hu Shih said, "We must open our eyes to find the 
right direction. We do not want to follow those blind leaders .... Our 
duty is that we will use our knowledge to observe objectively the true 
needs of the present-day China in order to decide our goal. We first 
46. Ibid., p. 40. 
47. Hu, Collected Essays of Hu Shih, vol. l, supra note 32, p. 430. 
48. Ibid., p. 451. 
49. Ibid., p. 430. 
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want to ask what have to be destroyed, which is a negative goal. Then 
we are going to ask what we want to build, which is our positive 
goal."50 Hu Shih's solution to the problem is simple: wholesale 
westernization. 
Hu Shih then called for a wholesale and wholehearted westerniza-
tion in China. He said: 
My own attitude is that we must unreservedly accept this 
modern civilization of the West because we need it to solve 
our most pressing problems, the problems of poverty, igno-
rance, disease and corruption. These are the real enemies we 
are facing, and none of these can be subjugated by the old 
civilization. . . . And I am convinced the old traditions will 
not be lost even when we take an extreme view of the need 
for modernization, because civilizations are conservative by 
their nature. By the natural inertia of cultures, the vast ma-
jority will take good care of those traditional values. But it 
behooves the leaders to go as far as they can in order that 
they may bring the masses to move a few steps farther in the 
direction of solving the most urgent problems of the nation 
by means of every instrumentality which this new civiliza-
tion can offer. 51 
Although the common goal of the Chinese modernizing elite in 
the period was the same: westernization in China, the methods of 
achieving this common goal were quite different in various groups of 
the modernizing elite. Conflicts of opinion rapidly developed over the 
ideological reconstruction of Chinese life. The doctrines of socialism, 
anarchism, nationalism, and communism were widely spread among 
Chinese modernizing elite in the period. 
In such an atmosphere, Hu Shih's advocacy of "wholesale west-
ernization" inevitably received both praise and challenge from Chinese 
modernizing elite. One of the strong supporters of Hu Shih's proposal 
was Professor Chen Hsu-Ching. In his various articles and books, 
Chen strongly agreed with Hu's opinion that the future of the Chinese 
civilization must rely on a thorough westernization. In his "The Fu-
ture of Chinese Civilization," Chen indicated two major reasons for a 
thorough wholesale westernization in China: first, western civilization 
is indeed more progressive than the Chinese; and second, western 
modern civilization is the symbol of the modem world, no matter 
50. Ibid., p. 436. 
51. Shih Hu, "Conflict of Culture," in B. Lasker and W.L. Holland, eds., Problems of 
the Pacific, 1931 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 477. 
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whether the Chinese accept it or not. Chen argued that the duty of 
human beings was not to preserve but to create civilization. He said, 
"The past civilization was a creation of our ancestors. But since the 
time and environment have been changed, we therefore have to create 
a new civilization to adjust to them. Otherwise, our race will become 
weaker and finally disappear."52 Thus, the adoption of western civili-
zation will not destroy Chinese traditional heritage completely; the lat-
ter will retain its position in Chinese history as part of the world 
civilization. 
However, Hu's proposal for a wholesale westernization faced a 
great challenge from other modernizing elite. The first came from 
professor Pan Kuan-tan, a sociologist at Yan Ching university. Pan 
expressed his agreement with a wholehearted modernization but not 
with a wholesale westernization. But the main critical challenge came 
from two other groups among modernizing elite: the moderate liber-
als, and the leftists. For the moderate liberals, Hu's idea was too radi-
cal; but for the leftists it was too conservative. 
The view of the moderate liberals was presented in a widely circu-
lated manifesto, "Reconstruction of Civilization on a Chinese Base," 
issued by ten distinguished professors, including Sa Meng-wu, T'ao 
Hsi-sheng, Ho Ping-sheng, and Huang Wen-hsan on January 10, 1935. 
The professor declared that they objected both to traditionalism and to 
blind imitation, and advocated preservation of the tradition with the 
addition of western learning according to the immediate needs of 
China. They indicated that in the process of reconstruction everyone 
should recognize that (1) China is China. She has her own peculiarity, 
(2) To either praise or criticize traditional Chinese values and institu-
tions is useless. The Chinese must reexamine their own tradition in 
order to preserve the best of it, (3) To adopt western civilization is 
necessary; but the adoption should be based on the needs of present-
day China, and not accept everything, (4) The reconstruction of civili-
zation on a Chinese base is to help Chinese people to catch up the 
West and to contribute to the world civilization, and (5) When the 
Chinese reconstruct themselves to be an integrated nation, then, they 
can help the world. Therefore, the reconstruction of civilization in 
China, according to the professors, must be "not to be conservative, 
and not be blind in following others. Based on Chinese civilization, we 
use scientific methods with a critical attitude to reexamine the past, to 
52. Hsi-ching Chen, The Future of Chinese Culture (Shanghai: Commercial Books, 
1934), p. 103. 
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preserve the present, and to create the future." 53 
In short, what these ten professors suggested is a selective assimi-
lation; they want to keep the best part of the traditional heritage and 
to mix it with the best of western civilization. Such a viewpoint is not 
new at all in China, according to Hu Shih. He said in his reply to the 
ten professors, "In their manifesto, the professors expressed their dis-
satisfaction with earlier attempts by Ch'ing scholars to combine Chi-
nese classics and Western technology. Although they spoke in a 
different way, their spirit was the same as Chang Chih-tung in the 
nineteenth century."54 The fundamental mistake these professors 
made, according to Hu Shih, is that they did not realize the nature of 
cultural change. Hu indicated that the common characteristics of cul-
tural change are (1) Civilization per se is conservative. The civiliza-
tion of a race has a great conservative nature which can correct the 
deviant patterns within it on the one hand, while resisting the invasion 
of foreign civilizations on the other, (2) The contact of two different 
civilizations will eliminate some parts of a civilization which are not 
useful any more, (3) In the process of such change, there is no stan-
dard criteria which can be taken to decide what part we want to keep 
and what we want to give away, (4) There is a limit on the process of 
cultural change. It is completely impossible to destroy the fundamen-
tal conservatism in a civilization. Regardless of changes in life, Chi-
nese will still be Chinese. Hu Shih then urged that "Chinese modern 
leaders should not worry about the crisis of the Chinese base, but 
about the conservatism of the traditional Chinese civilization. The cri-
sis is not the non-appearance of their characteristics of Chinese polit-
ical organization, social institutions, and ideological thoughts such as 
these ten professors worried about; what we should worry now is that 
there are just too many bad traditions in the Chinese political organi-
zation, social institutions, and ideological thoughts. Therefore, we 
must accept the world civilization of science and technology, and the 
spirit behind it. We should let this world civilization have free contact 
with our traditional civilization. The final consequence of such a con-
tact is undoubtedly a Chinese based civilization."55 
According to Hu Shih, the result of the contact of Chinese and 
Western civilization will not be the complete dismissal of Chinese 
traditional civilization but the emergence of a new Chinese civilization 
having modern world characteristics including both Chinese and west-
53. Meng-wu Sa, et al., "Reconstruction of Civilization on a Chinese Base" (no pub-
lisher listed). 
54. Hu, Hu Shih and the Sino- Western Cultures, supra note 34, p. 135. 
55. Ibid., pp. 135-136. 
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em traits. The difference between Hu Shih and other professors, thus, 
lay in their method of modernization in China. Since for Hu Shih, 
reformers should go as far as possible in order to eliminate the inade-
quacy of traditional civilization; a wholesale westernization is only a 
beginning; the final stage in a new Chinese civilization having both 
Chinese and Western characteristics. For the ten professors, the re-
formers have to be careful not to lose their heads in the process of 
modernization; everything has to be planned from the beginning. The 
Chinese must reexamine their tradition in order to preserve the best 
part of it and to accept the best part of Western civilization in terms of 
China's need. 
Another criticism of Hu Shih and his followers came from the 
leftists which included socialists and communists such as Chen Tu-
hsiu and Li Ta-chao. Although Hu Shih shared with the leftists the 
belief that the problem of China can only be solved by a thorough 
westernization, the ideologies and methods of reform of Hu and the 
leftists were quite different. Ideologically, Hu Shih emphasized 
strongly Dewey's experimentalism and Huxley's skepticism, while the 
leftists evoked Marxism and the dialectic method in the analysis of 
Chinese social and political problems. Hu Shih and his followers were 
convinced that the problems of China could not be solved altogether, 
but must be tackled individually. They insisted that there was no sin-
gle prescription which could cure every kind of disease. Only through 
education and the proper approach to practical problems can China be 
modernized. Hu Shih and his followers strongly believed that revolu-
tion was not necessary; a gradual reform in every aspect of society in 
terms of a far-reaching plan was what China needed at the time. In 
"Our Political Aims," Hu and his followers said, "We deeply believe 
that the worst disease of China is that planning is a necessary condi-
tion for efficiency; and that even an ordinary plan is better than noth-
ing .... We want to have a government of constitution, of publicity, 
and of planning .... In order to reach this aim, we suggest that (1) a 
peace conference be held between south and north; (2) peace talks 
must be based on the reestablishment of the Congress; (3) the size of 
the army be reduced; (4) the number of government officials be re-
duced; (5) the election system be improved; and (6) a public and well-
planned finance be maintained. "56 
Thus, it is clear what Hu Shih and his followers suggested is not 
the overthrow of the Chinese government through violence. Rather it 
is a plan for gradual reform on different levels of the political and 
56. Hu, Collected Essays of Hu Shih, supra note 32, pp. 141-143. 
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social systems in China at the time. Meanwhile, Hu and his followers 
thought it was too early for China to have a national democracy; 
China must practice democracy on a small-scale basis first, i.e., on a 
local or provincial level, before the development of a national democ-
racy. During this initial stage, Chinese politics must not rely on any 
political party; it would be best for the country to be without any or-
ganized party. 
Such a political point of view immediately received criticism from 
both Chen Tu-hsiu and his communist comrades. In an article, "My 
Opinion on Contemporary Chinese Political Problems," Chen accused 
Hu and Hu's supporters of not understanding the true factors of Chi-
nese political conflicts. Chen pointed out that the Chinese political 
conflict was due to the independence of warlords in each province, and 
the failure to control these warlords by the central government. 
Therefore, the proposal for a local democracy would create more 
problems than it solved in this situation. Chen said, "My solution for 
the present-day Chinese political problems is to organize a strong 
political party in order to destroy the warlords, to establish an inte-
grated nation, and to guard against the international imperialism. 
Only through such a method, can China be a true independent 
nation. " 57 
Similar criticism is also indicated in a manifesto issued by the 
Chinese communist organization, "The Chinese Communists' Propo-
sal on the Political Situation." The communists labeled Hu's proposal 
as a compromise between pacifism and capitalism. The communists 
wanted to have immediate action directed toward the final goal of 
revolution. The educational process and gradual reform were for 
them too slow to have any effect. 
While Hu Shih and his followers took the student movement in 
1925 as a great achievement of the educational and cultural move-
ment, the leftists regarded it as the symbol of the direct political strug-
gle between the government and the people. And while the liberals 
remained in the academic circle to advocate freedom of thought and 
expression, the leftists went out on the street to organize workers and 
students to protect the government's policy in domestic and foreign 
affairs. 
2. Hu Shih and Chinese Traditional Elite 
As has just been discussed, the debate between Hu Shih and the 
57. Chen's article is included in Hu Shih's 1953 publication, Collected Essays of Hu 
Shih, supra note 32, pp. 119-128. 
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other modernizing elite was focused mainly on the proper ideological 
foundation and the methods of modernization in China. The argu-
ment between the modernizing and traditional elites was, however, 
concerned with the role of Confucianism in society in the age of crisis. 
Hu and the other modernizing elite pointed out clearly the inadequacy 
of Confucian values and institutions in the process of Chinese modern-
ization; and the Confucian six classics were not capable of educating 
Chinese youth on the one hand or of creating a new leadership on the 
other. 
Although the traditional elite did not give Hu Shih and the other 
modernizing elite any serious or fatal challenge on the latter's search 
for Chinese modernization, there were some older intellectuals such as 
Liang Shu-ming, and Ku Hung-ming, who raised the matter of re-
sisting the acceptance of western civilization. Their arguments on 
maintaining the Chinese tradition were supported later by Liang Chi-
chao, a famous scholar and earlier reformer who had changed his atti-
tude after a visit to Europe in 1919, where he saw the collapse of west-
ern scientific civilization during and after the World War I. For Liang 
Chi-chao, the war in Europe was clear evidence of a basic social intel-
lectual malaise in the West which stemmed from its blind worship of 
science. He said, 
Those who praised the omnipotence of science had hoped 
previously that as soon as science succeeded, the golden age 
would appear forthwith. Now science is successful indeed; 
material progress in the West in the last one hundred years 
has greatly surpassed the achievements of the three thousand 
years prior to this period. Yet we human beings have not 
secured happiness; on the contrary, science gives us catastro-
phes. . . . The Europeans have dreamed a vast dream of om-
nipotence of science; not they decry its bankruptcy. This is a 
major turning-point in the world thought. 58 
Therefore, Liang believed that the Chinese would assume great 
responsibilities in the reconstruction of world civilization. "Oh, our 
lovable youths!" said Liang, "Attention! March On! Millions of peo-
ple on the other shore of the ocean are worrying about the bankruptcy 
of material civilization, sorrowfully and desperately crying for help, 
waiting for your aid. Our ancestors in Heaven, the Sage, and the older 
generations are all earnestly hoping you will carry out their task. 
58. Chi-ch'ao Liang, Yin-ping shih wen-chi [Collected Works of Liang Chi-ch'ao] 
(Taipei: Chung-hwa Books, 1967), p. 328. 
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Their spirit is helping you!"59 But in order to contribute to world civi-
lization, Liang pointed out that Chinese youth must love and respect 
their own civilization first. 
A stronger view of traditionalism came from Liang Shu-ming, a 
professor of Chinese philosophy. In his book, Eastern and Western 
Civilizations and Their Philosophies, and his article, "The Final Awak-
ening of the Chinese People's Self-Salvation Movement," Liang Shu-
ming attempted to develop a new formulation of Confucianism. He 
tried to show that the Chinese civilization was relevant to the modern 
world. According to him, Western civilization sought satisfaction 
from the external world and from other people; the Chinese attitude 
was one of harmonization and satisfaction through adjustment; and 
the Indian attitude was escapist. The failure of the western civilization 
in World War I indicated it would give way to the Chinese, resulting 
in a higher world civilization which would mold the scientific and ma-
terial successes of its predecessor to mass intellectual, moral, and ethi-
cal nature. On the problem of China, he argued that because China 
was different from Western nations, it would be wrong to import such 
Western political systems as democracy and communism. Liang said, 
"The foundation of a race is its spirit. To give up one's own spirit 
would result in destroying one's future. The future and the new life 
are developed on this spiritual basis which can not be imported from 
outside and be devalued. One should hold its own position to develop 
its characters."60 
The third influential traditional defendant was Ku Hung-ming. 
Ku was an European-educated scholar. He had a M.A. degree from a 
university in England; he had the experience of living in several Euro-
pean nations; and he also knew many European languages. Compared 
with Liang Chi-chao and Liang Shu-ming, Ku's ideals were even more 
conservative and critical. Essentially, Ku's defense of traditional Con-
fucian values emerged from his criticism of Western civilization. His 
argument rarely touched on Western technology. His central focus 
was the moral aspect of life. According to Ku, Confucian values were 
immortal while Western civilization would not last for long, the West-
em political and legal systems were based on the concepts of right and 
obligation which were not good enough to keep society at peace. Ku 
characterized the Chinese people as deep, broad, simple, and possessed 
of a "Divine Duty of Loyalty." The moral emphasis in Confucianism 
59. Ibid., p. 328. 
60. Shu-min Liang, East- West Civilizations and their Philosophies (Shanghai: Commer-
cial Books, 1921 ), p. 100. 
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made Chinese society peaceful for several thousand years. The essen-
tial problem of China's survival today, according to Ku, is not tech-
nology but morality. The future of China relies on her moral, not her 
material development. He then accused the modernizing elite failed to 
realize such an essential problem in China while begging for the help 
of the West in attempting to solve China's own problem. 
In summary, the Chinese intellectual's view on modernization in 
China were largely defensive in nature. The modernizing elite pro-
moted modernization in an effort to upgrade China's respectability, 
while the traditional elite resisted modernization with the aim of the 
preservation of traditional Confucianism. 
IV. FOUR MAJOR DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES 
In Chinese usage, the word "modernization" was first referred to 
as the process of imitation and adoption of the western model of tech-
nological development. Later, the extent of modernization was ex-
panded to include the upgradings of the traditional Chinese socio-
economic-political system to be compatible with the societal growth in 
the contemporary era. 
Historically, the Chinese modernization process can be divided 
into four major developmental stages, each with its own distinguished 
characteristics. They are (I) Involuntary and Defensive Westerniza-
tion, 1840-1895, (II) Reform and Revolution, 1896-1911, 
(III) Authority Crisis and Disorganization, 1912-1948, and 
(IV) Communist vs. Capitalist approaches, 1949 to the present. 
(I) Involuntary and Defensive Westernization-the first stage in 
the Chinese modernization process is distinguished by the involuntary 
Chinese acceptance of Western technological superiority. The period 
begins with the Opium War in 1840 and ends with the defeat in the 
Sino-Japanese War in 1895. In general, modernization was seen in 
this stage as a cause for destruction and discontent. Several interna-
tional and domestic events at the time have contributed in making the 
Chinese awareness of Western superiority and the painful acceptance 
of Western technology. 
In international affairs, we saw the frequent defeats of the Chinese 
at the hands of Western nations and Japan. During this period, China 
had wars with almost every major power in the West and with Japan. 
The treaties signed with foreign nations include the following: 
a) 1842 The Treaty of Nanking, signed with English. 
b) 1858 The Treaties of Tientsin, signed with English-
France allied forces. 
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c) 1860 The Treaties of Peking, signed with English-France 
allied forces. 
d) 1881 The Treaty of IIi, signed with Russia. 
e) 1895 The Sino-Japanese Treaty of Shimonoseki. 
After each defeat, China had to grant privileges of trade and concede 
part of its territory to the winning nations. Moreover, China sustained 
a great loss of sovereignty by permitting foreign war vessels and com-
mercial ships to navigate rivers in the interior, by the clause allowing 
consular jurisdiction, by allowing foreign missionaries to buy land in 
the interior, and by permitting a settlement zone for foreigners in ma-
jor cities. 
At the same time, troubles in China's extraordinary vast country-
side grew in size and became uncontrollable. Suffering from the polit-
ical corruption of Manchu Court, from foreign interference with their 
traditional way of life and from natural disasters that frequently oc-
curred during the period, the dissatisfied peasantry joined various un-
derground secret societies in an effort to get protection and started to 
rebel against the corrupt government. In 1851, the Taiping Rebellion 
broke out and spread over a large portion of China before it was sup-
pressed in 1864, the Nien Rebellion broke out in 1853 and lasted until 
1868, and the Moslem Rebellion broke out in Yunnan and ran its 
course from 1855 to 1873. Although these long-lasting rebellions did 
not establish any rival governments to contest the court at Peking, the 
need for change became apparent.61 
China was thus forced to recognize the Western superiority. A 
group of Chinese ruling elite and intellectuals felt that the only way to 
save China was to introduce and accept Western technology, espe-
cially military technology. Under the leaderships of Tseng Kuo-fan 
and Li Hung-chang, a number of Westernization programs were in-
stalled. The list included the following important accomplishment: 
1863 A foreign language school was established. 
1865 The Kiangnan Arsenal was established. 
1867 The Nanking Arsenal was established. 
1870 A machine factory was enlarged at Tientsin. 
1871 A foreign-style fort was planned for Taku. 
1872 Students were sent to study in America. Officers 
61. For detailed discussion on China's crisis during this period, please refer to Chien-
nung Li, The Political History of China, 1840-1928 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1967). Chung-li Chang, The Chinese Gentry (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1955). Ssu-ho Ch'i, Ya-pien Chan-cheng The Opium War, 6 vols. (Shanghai: People's 
Press, 1957). 
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were sent to study military science in Germany. The 
China Merchants Steam Navigation Company was 
organized. 
1875 A plan was made to build steel warships. 
1876 A request was made to open a bureau to study foreign 
sciences in all provinces; also to add a new subject on 
foreign affairs in the civil service examinations. Stu-
dents and apprentices from the Foochow shipyard 
were sent to Germany for advanced training. 
1878 The Kaiping coal mine was opened. 
1879 A telegraph line was opened from Taku to Tientsin. 
1880 A plan for a modern navy was launched, beginning 
with a program to purchase warships from foreign 
countries. A naval school was established at Tientsin. 
1881 A dockyard was built at Port Arthur. A cotton mill 
was planned at Shanghai. 
1885 A military preparatory school was established. The 
navy yamen was inaugurated. 
1887 Mints were established at Tientsin and Paoting. 
1888 The Peiyang Army was organized. 
1891 The Lung-chang paper mill was founded at Shanghai. 
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The above list of Westernization programs is heavily focused on im-
proving Chinese military strength by buying Western warships, by set-
ting a modern communication network, by studying Western military 
strategy, by developing natural resources, and by learning foreign 
languages. 
At the same time, the traditional sector of Chinese intellectuals 
was undergoing a stage of self examination and evaluation in a fanati-
cal effort to slow down Western invasion of Chinese culture. The tra-
ditionalists claimed Western civilization as being materialistic and 
lacking spiritual virtue, and thus inferior to Confucian teachings. Tra-
ditionalist Feng Kuei-fen said: 
The intelligence and wisdom of the Chinese are necessarily 
superior to those of the various barbarians, only formerly we 
have not made use of them. . . . If we let Chinese ethics and 
famous (Confucian) teachings serve as an original founda-
tion and let them be supplemented by the methods used by 
the various nations for the attainment of prosperity and 
strength, would it not be the best of all procedures?62 
62. Cited in Fairbank and Teng, eds., China's Response to the West, supra note 26, pp. 
52-54. 
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By the end of the period, however, the traditionalists gradually lost 
their appeal for the preservation and restoration of Confucian order as 
China lost war after war to every foreign nation they had fought 
against and faced an immediate total destruction. Mary C. Wright 
refers this effort of the traditionalists as "the last stand of Chinese 
Conservatism,"63 by which she suggested thereafter there was no effec-
tive formal defense of the Confucian ethic. 
As one can see easily the only purpose of t~e Westernization pro-
grams at this stage was to save China from foreign domination. Mili-
tary reform programs became the prime target for Westernization, 
while social and political institutions still remained largely untouched. 
The ultimate goal of the government sponsored Westernization pro-
grams was to achieve military equality with the West while at the 
same time maintaining the traditional social and political systems as 
intact as possible. Gasster points out, "all that they (the Chinese) did 
... they considered means of defense. Each step had to be justified on 
the grounds that it would help to keep the foreigners out; at the same 
time, each experiment had to be guaranteed not to impinge upon the 
essentials of Chinese life. " 64 
In short, what the Chinese leaders really intended to achieve dur-
ing the period in the first stage was on"Iy a limited partial change on 
the improvement of military technology, not an extended change on 
the part of social structure. 
(II) Reform and Revolution-The second stage in the Chinese 
modernization process begins with the campaign by K'ang Yu-wei for 
an extensive reform program on the socio-political institution of China 
immediately following the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War in 
1895 and ends with the success of the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty 
under the revolutionary leadership of Dr. Sun yat-sen in 1911. 
The dream of building a strong new China through the reap-
proachment of a Confucian revival and a military Westernization was 
completely destroyed in 1895 after China lost the war to Japan. Most 
Chinese had never regarded Japan as a strong or superior nation in 
any respect. The defeat thus was an unbelievable shock to everyone. 
The feeling of shame and inferiority quickly spread through the whole 
country, from the scholar-officials at the top of the hierarchy to the 
common people at the bottom, and from the urban centers to every 
corner of the countryside throughout China. The inefficiency and in-
63. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, supra note 31. 
64. Michael Gaster, China's Struggle to Modernize (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knoft, 1972), p. 
15. 
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adequacy of a partial reform such as a military Westernization pro-
gram launched during the first stage now became apparent and 
manifest. People now demanded a radical change and a far-reaching 
plan covering every aspect of the social, economic, educational, and 
political systems. Two groups of activists emerged during the period. 
The first was a group of lower and middle ranking officials under the 
leadership of K'ang Yu-wei which advocated extensive social and 
political reforms, while the second group was led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen 
who saw total revolution as the only way to save China. 
K'ang Yu-wei was a reformed Confucian scholar who believed 
China's problems were rooted deeply in the Confucian Classics which 
had been misinterpreted and malpracticed until now. K'ang argues 
the idea of reform was not anti-Confucianism but an integrated part of 
the true Confucian teaching. He says: 
For China, on the great earth, has had a ceaseless succession 
of sacred emperors and the country has been famous. Her 
principles, institutions, and culture are the most elevated in 
the world. . . . Among all countries on earth none is her 
equal. Only because her customs are unenlightened and be-
cause of a dearth of men of ability, she is passively taking 
aggression and insult. . . . The water in the ocean is bubbling 
and boiling. In our ears and in our dreams the noise of artil-
lery is roaring. All you gentlemen, how can you avoid the 
grief of being ruined and (becoming) subject to the rule of a 
different race? Are we trying to avoid slander? 0 you closed-
door scholars, are some of you to the point of speaking about 
respecting the emperor and refecting the barbarians?65 
K'ang Yu-wei won the support of a small group of Chinese 
scholar-officials and was introduced to Emperor Kuang-hsu. On June 
16, 1898, K'ang was appointed Probationary Secretary in the Tsungli 
Yamen to carry out his reform programs. K'ang's proposed reform 
included the following: 
a. Changing the topics for themes in the district, provincial, and 
metropolitan examinations from the selections from the Four Books to 
topics on current problems. 
b. Establishing a bureau of agriculture, industry, and commerce 
in Peking. 
c. Abolishing the sinecure appointments in the imperial 
65. Cited in Fairbank and Teng, eds., China's Response to the West, supra note 26, p. 
153. 
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supervisorate of instruction, office of transmission, court of imperial 
entertainments, court of state ceremonial, and grand court of revision. 
d. Including the test of knowledge and techniques of Western 
artilleries in the recruitment and training of military personnels. 
e. Requiring students in all levels of schools in China to engage 
in both Chinese and Western studies. 
Although K'ang was able to attract the support of the Emperor, 
the reform lasted only one hundred days as the Emperor was put 
under house arrest by the Empress Tz'u-hsi who was the real power 
holder of the time, after an unsuccessful coup d'etat in against the 
Empress. K'ang was able to escape out of Peking, but five of his top 
supports were captured and later executed by the Empress. Many of 
K'ang's followers went underground and joined the revolutionary 
movement led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in working for the overthrow of the 
Ch'ing dynasty and for building a new China. 
Unlike K'ang Yu-wei, Dr. Sun Yat-sen was not a Confucian 
scholar. He was educated in Hong Kong and Hawaii and trained in 
Western medicine with a very limited knowledge on the Chinese Clas-
sics. In fact, in his early years Dr. Sun was not much of a revolution-
ary theorist but merely an activist. His program for China's 
reconstruction developed more closely than his persistent plotting to 
overthrow the Manchus. Nevertheless, the failure of K'ang's reform 
movement gave Dr. Sun and his revolutionary party a great opportu-
nity to expand its organization and to challenge the Manchu regime 
militantly. Four major goals of Dr. Sun's revolution at that time were 
(a) Drive out the Tartars, (2) Restore China, (3) Establish the Repub-
lic, and (4) Equalize land ownership. 
Dr. Sun's revolutionary ideas gradually ripened among the edu-
cated class within and without China after K'ang's failure. He was 
particularly popular among the advanced Chinese students abroad, 
and his headquarters was located in Japan. From 1906 to 1911, eleven 
serious attempts were made to overthrow the Manchu regime by mili-
tary means: 
1906 The attempt at P'ing-hsing and Liu-yang, Hunan. 
1907 The attempt at Chaochow and Huang-kang, 
Kwangtung. 
1907 The attempt at Huichow in Kwangtung. 
1907 The attempt at Anking, Anhwei. 
1907 The attempt at Ch'in-chou and Lien-chou m 
Kwangtung. 
1907 The attempt at Chen-nan-kuan, Kwangsi. 
1908 The attempt at Anking, Anhwei. 
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1910 The attempt at Canton. 
1910 The attempt to assassinate the regent, Tsai-feng. 
1911 The attempt at Huang-hua-kang, Kwangtung. 
39 
Although these attempts all resulted in failure, they did plant 
seeds for later uprisings and the further spread of revolutionary ideas 
from the Southeastern Coast of China to the interior provinces. A 
large scale uprising at Wuchang on October 10, 1911 finally turned 
into a successful revolution for Dr. Sun's party which eventually over-
threw the Manchu regime. A republican government was established 
on January 1, 1912. 
(Ill) Authority Crisis and Disorganization-The third major 
developmental stage in China's modernization effort covers the entire 
period of the so-called republican China, from 1912 to 1949, before the 
takeover of the mainland by the Chinese Communists. The major 
characteristic of this period was the Chinese search for authority. The 
intellectuals were considering various ideologies for modernization, 
the political elites were advocating diverse Western political systems, 
and the new merchants on the East coast and in the urban centers 
were advertising for a free capitalist economy in China. Conflicting 
programs were proposed and put into practice, and the results were 
chaos and disorganization. 66 
This period also marked the beginning of the total withdrawal of 
the traditionalists. No one wanted to return to the old traditional 
ways without reservation. The question people asked now was what 
kind of modern system China should adopt-republic or dictatorship, 
capitalism or socialism, democracy or something else. Various groups 
fought for their own beliefs and systems, and each had its own version 
of what China's future ought to be. 
Thus, the May Fourth Movement of 1919, the civil war between 
the Nationalists and the Chinese Communists throughout the most 
part of this period, and even the fighting among the warlords during 
the 1920s, can all be seen as incidents of how various groups fight for 
their own version of China's future. The conflicts we saw in this pe-
riod were not really a case of the modernizing elite fighting against the 
66. For detailed discussion on authority crisis and disorganization during this period, 
please refer to Tsai, Patterns of Political Elite Mobility in Modern China, 1912-1949. supra 
note 25, Wen-hui Tsai, Essays on the Study of Chinese Modernization (Taipei: Oriental 
Cultural Service, 1976). 1-tsu, The History of Chinese Political Parties During the Late 
Ching and Early Republic (Hong Kong: Chung-san Books, 1968). Joseph R. Levenson, 
Liang Chi-ch 'ao and the Mind of Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1970). Chi-ming Hou, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China, 1840-1937 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965). 
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traditionalists, but rather a case of struggles for power between com-
peting modernizing groups. It was, in short, a period of confusion, of 
searching for authority, and of power consolidation. 
Yet, during this period, we also saw a brief period of constructive 
development moving toward making a better China. In a ten-year pe-
riod between 1927 and 1937, China enjoyed a temporary unity under 
one single leadership, Chiang Kai-shek. The improvements included 
the following: 
1) In transportation-The national railway system was ex-
tended from 8,000 kilometers to 13,000 kilometers, the highway from 
1,000 kilometers to 115,700 kilometers, and three national and re-
gional airlines began to offer commercial air service. 
b) In finance and economy-The national banking system was 
reorganized into an integrated network, inflation was partially under 
control, and the volumes of export and import trade increased 
significantly. 
c) In agriculture and mining-A Farmer's Bank was established 
to provide loans for needed rural developments, a natural resource 
commission was put up to be in charge of industrial development and 
mining enterprises, and a national industrial planning was first 
proposed. 
d) In education-The number of universities and colleges in-
creased from 70 to 108, middle schools from 954 to 1956, teacher's 
schools frorri 236 to 816, and vocational schools from 149 to 494. 
Unfortunately, the effort was interrupted by the outbreak of the 
Sino-Japanese War and World War II. The subsequent civil war be-
tween the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists after the War 
made the continuation of modernization programs impossible. 
(IV) Communist vs. Capitalist Approaches-The Chinese Com-
munists victory on the mainland and the Nationalists withdrawal to 
the island of Taiwan in 1949 marked the beginning of a new era in 
China's long struggle for modernization. It signified not only the for-
mal separation of two political regimes, but also the differential adop-
tion of a modernization path: the Communist approach on mainland 
China and the Capitalist approach in Taiwan. 
During this period, most of the conflicting elements which we 
saw in earlier stages have largely been eliminated and each political 
government has established a firm policy on modernization program-
ming. The results are different. 
In Taiwan, the Nationalist government under the leaderships of 
Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, has taken a very ac-
tive and effective role in planning the island's economic growth and 
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has successfully built a progressive growing capitalist economy in Tai-
wan over the past 30 years. Between 1953 and 1977, the government 
has carried out six successive four-year economic plans through which 
Taiwan's economy has switched from agriculture to an export-ori-
ented industry. The result is a rapidly growing economy characterized 
by export expansion, higher national income, the increase of GNP, 
and more employment opportunity. Statistically speaking, the foreign 
trade volume reached to $23,714 million and 89.1 percent of exports 
came from industrial products in 1978; average income per capita 
reached $1,722 in 1979; and an annual economic growth rate of 10.5 
percent in 1978. 
Economist Herman Kahn has singled out Taiwan, along with 
South Korea and Japan, as "heroes" of development for they have 
lifted themselves from object poverty to middle income levels in less 
than a decade. Kahn predicts that Taiwan is now within a decade or 
so of becoming fully a mature industrial economy and that it should 
soon become a full fledged member of the affluent groups of nations.67 
In a report prepared for the World Bank, Fei, Randis & Kuo also have 
a similar high praise for Taiwan. They note that Taiwan's success is 
rare among less developed countries due to its extremely rapid rates of 
economic growth, better distribution of income, and lower rate of 
unemployment. 68 
The Chinese Communists seized power from the nationalists in 
1949. The strategy for economic development was built upon much 
trial and error practice and from Chairman Mao's experience in his 
guerrilla days. Over the thirty year period in Communist China, the 
economic policies that served as vehicles for the strategy occurred can 
be summarized in seven distinct "waves": 
1) Economic reconstruction and land reforms. . . . . . . 1949-1952 
2) Industrialization, nationalization, and collectivation: 
the first five year plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1953-1957 
3) The Great Leap Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1958-1959 
4) Readjustment and recovery; priority given to 
agriculture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1960-1965 
5) The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution . . . . . . 1966-1969 
6) Balanced growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1970-1977 
7) Four Modernizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1978 
We call the economic policies and growth in Communist China as a 
67. Herman Kahn, World Economic Development (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Pub-
lisher, 1979), pp. 329-330. 
68. John C.H. Fei, Gustav Ranis and Shirley W.Y. Kuo, Growth with Equity: The 
Taiwan Case (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
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series of "waves" because of their inconsistency and great fluctuation 
within and between "waves." During the first and second waves be-
tween 1949 and 1957, the Chinese economy experienced a period of 
rehabilitation and rebuilding with the implementation of the first Five-
year Plan. By the end of this period, agricultural and industrial out-
puts both had shown increases. But the third wave was a disaster as 
Mao called for a "Great Leap Forward." Between 1960 and 1965, the 
Chinese economy bounced back in this period, evidenced by orderly 
advances in many spheres of the nation. But unfortunately, the opti-
mism quickly faded away with the outbreak of the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution in 1966; and for the next ten years China was in 
total chaos. The death of Mao in 1976 marked a new beginning; the 
new leader Deng Xiao-ping's call for Four Modernizations has started 
to show impacts in Chinese life in the 1980s 
There have been considerable disagreements among scholars on 
the economic situation in Communist China. Some feel that the Com-
munists' achievement is indeed impressive. Al Imfelt says, "After ex-
amining so many elements of China's model of development in 
isolation and in various combinations, one can only reassemble the 
whole and ask, is it working? The answer, obviously, is yes."69 Alex-
ander Eckstein also has similar observation, he says, "China's eco-
nomic performance must be considered as impressive. . . . There is 
very little doubt that the Chinese economy has been growing quite 
rapidly."70 
However, such a positive evaluation of the Communists' economy 
has been challenged by quite a few scholars who insist the Commu-
nists are basically a backward country economically. They argued the 
so-called economic achievement of the Communists is too small and 
limited to allow any real appreciation. This is particularly true when 
one compares the economic achievement of Taiwan with that of the 
Communists. Futhermore, the social and cultural developments of 
Taiwan can not be matched by the Communists.71 
Thus, this fourth stage of Chinese modernization is characterized 
by two competing socio-economic approaches between the Commu-
nists and the Republic of China in Taiwan. The result has been differ-
ent: The Nationalists in Taiwan are much more progressively 
69. AI. Imfeld, China as a Model of Development (N.Y.: Maryknoll, 1976), p. 148. 
70. Alexander Eckstein, China's Economic Revolution (N.Y.: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977), p. 310. 
71. E.g., Chu-yuan Cheng, China's Economic Development (Boulder, Colorado: West-
view Publisher, 1983). 
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advanced in socio-economic than the Communist government of the 
People's Republic of China on the mainland. 
V. THE "TAIWAN MIRACLE" 
In China's long struggle toward modernization over the past one 
hundred and forty years, the achievement of Taiwan since 1949 stands 
out as extraordinary. it has shown to the world that Chinese society 
can be successfully industrialized and that Confucianism is not all in-
conducive to industrialization and economic growth. Many Third 
World nations have tried at modernization since the end of World 
War II, but only a handful of them have been able to succeed. Taiwan 
is one of these selected few which have succeeded. In the eyes of those 
that are still struggling, Taiwan has created a "miracle." In this sec-
tion, we will give a detailed discussion of Taiwan's economic and so-
cial modernizations since 1949. 
1. Industrialization and Economic Growth 
The Nationalist Government's effort in improving Taiwan's 
socio-economic structure could be traced back to the land reform pro-
gram of 1949, four years prior to the announcement of the First Four-
year Plan for economic development. The first step in the land re-
form program was to reduce farm rent and to increase the share of 
tenant farmers in crop yields, providing enough incentive for hard 
work. The second step, which was launched in 1951, was to sell public 
land to tenant farmers, followed by a program of compulsory sale of 
land by landlords in 1953. The general objectives of the land reform 
program are twofold: the new cultivators were encouraged to work 
harder because they would benefit from any increase in agricultural 
output, while the landlords were encouraged to participate in the in-
dustrial development of Taiwan through ownership of four large-scale 
industrial enterprises at the time. 
The success of the land reform program laid the foundation for a 
modem economy in Taiwan. In the first two Four-Year Plans from 
1953 to 1960, continuation of agriculture programs was evident: 
"land-to-the-tiller program" was earnestly carried out, irrigation sys-
tems were repaired and expanded, and breeds of animals and strains of 
seeds were improved. In industry, labor intensive production was en-
couraged to allow local products to compete with imported consumer 
goods on the one hand, while raw material supplies and domestic pro-
ductive capacity were expanded to stabilize commodity price and to 
improve the country's balance of payments position. The overall ob-
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jective of the economic plannings during this period was to develop 
industry through agriculture. 
The second stage of Taiwan's economic planning, goals of which 
were outlined in the Third and Fourth Four-Year Plans, from 1960 to 
the early 1970's, saw a rapid eexpansion in economic activity. Several 
programs were launched during the period aiming at switching Tai-
wan's economy from an agricultural to an industrial base, which in-
cluded specific plans to encourage investment, renovate the financial 
institution and system, and increase the pace of modernization. One 
very important policy was the decision to place emphasis on the devel-
opment of labor-intensive industries to manufacture products for ex-
port. The result was a rapidly growing economy characterized by 
export expansion, the increase of GNP and national income, and a full 
employment in Taiwan by the end of the 1960's. 
The fast growth of Taiwan's economy is not without problems, 
however. By the early 1970s, it had become clear that although the 
basis of the economy had gradually shifted from agriculture to indus-
try, the industrial structure itself had undergone little transformation. 
Major problems included the inability of the infrastructure to accom-
modate the economy's increasing demands, the necessity of importing 
almost all basic materials and intermediate goods, the shortage of la-
bor and rising wage rates, the growing number and efficiency of inter-
national competitors, and unbalanced foreign trades. 
The need for a basic shift in economic planning was made obvious 
by the oil crisis of 1973 and the resulting world-wide recession. Like 
that of many other countries, the economy of Taiwan suffered tremen-
dously because of steeply rising commodity prices and inflation. 
In order to meet the twin cltallenges of an outdated economic 
structure and spiralling inflation, the government instituted a series of 
far-ranging projects designed to transform Taiwan into a modem in-
dustrialized economy by the mid-1980's. Long-range plans were de-
veloped to promote modem management techniques and to update 
industrial production methods through the Ten major Development 
Projects and the Accelerated Rural Development Program. 
The Ten major Development Projects, at the cost of $6.7 billion, 
were aimed at production of energy and efficient transportation net-
work. Six of these projects were concerned with transportation: the 
Sun Yat-sen national Freeway, railway electrification, the North Link 
Railway, the Chiang Kai-shek International Airport at Taoyuan, and 
the construction of harbors at Taichung and Suao. Three projects 
were designed to develop heavy and chemical industries: an integrated 
steel mill, Kaohsiung shipyard, and a petrochemical complex. The 
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tenth was the building of nuclear power plants to develop new sources 
of energy. 
The Accelerated Rural Development Program was aimed at pro-
tecting farmers' earnings, modernizing agriculture, increasing farm in-
comes, and employing farm workers more productively. The program 
included the following measures: 
a. Abolition of the rice-fertilizer barter system. 
b. Abolition of the education surtax on farmland. 
c. Easing of agricultural credit terms. 
d. Improvement of agricultural marketing. 
e. Strengthening of the rural infrastructure. 
f. Integrated use of improved cultivation techniques. 
g. Establishment of specialized agricultural areas. 
h. Strengthening of agricultural research and extension. 
1. Establishment of new industries in rural areas. 
J. Increase in purchase price of rice paid to farmers. 
With the completion of the Ten Major Development 
Projects and the Accelerated Rural Development Program 
in 1979, the government announced a new Twelve New De-
velopment Projects to continue the country's modernization. 
Again, a heavy emphasis was placed upon transportation as 
we saw five of the twelve projects all dealing with transporta-
tion improvement: around-the-island railroad, three new 
cross-island highways, Kaohsiung-Pingtung regional traffic 
improvement, the second and third phases of Taichung Har-
bor, and widening of the Pingtung-Kaohsiung highways. 
The other seven projects included two for agriculture, two 
for industrial plants, and three for socio-cultural 
developments. 
In summary, Taiwan has successfully carried out five 
Four-Year Plans from 1953 to 1973. The Sixth Four-Year 
Plan was cut short due to the oil crises and the worldwide 
recession in 1973. The government instituted a new Six-
Year Plan in 1976 which was completed in 1981, and a new 
Ten-Year Plan was launched in 1982 aiming at transforming 
Taiwan's economy from labor-intensive industry to high 
technology. 
The results from these economic plannings are remarka-
bly successful in Taiwan. The national economy has shifted 
from agriculture-oriented to industrial-oriented within a 
short period of thirty years. When the Nationalist govern-
ment of the Republic of China moved to Taiwan in 1949, 
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Taiwan was predominately an agricultural society with a 
large proportion of its population residing in rural areas. 
The economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s has changed its 
economic structure and population distribution 
dramatically. 
In economic structural change, we saw a gradual shift 
in production from agriculture to industry. As shown in Ta-
ble 2, industrial product occupied only 13.01 percent of the 
total net domestic product in 1951, it was increased to 42.72 
percent in 1981. As a result, the agriculture population also 
declined which was reflected in the significant growth of the 
non-agricultural population from 4 7.13 percent in 1951 to 
71.9 percent in 1981. The transformation of an industrial-
oriented economy and the expansion of the npn-agricultural 
population have also made rates of economic growth very 
impressive. They ranged from 5.5 percent to 13.5 percent 
annually in Taiwan between 1956 and 1979. Even the cur-
rent recession of the 1980s failed to drastically slowdown 
Taiwan's economic growth as the gross national product and 
per capita income continued to grow. 
Most impressively, however, is Taiwan's achievement 
on a more equitable distribution of income during the years 
of rapid economic growth. Fei, et. al. noted that "Taiwan's 
achievement in the years after 1953 are particularly notable: 
extremely rapid rates of economic growth were accompanied 
by improvements in the family distribution of income; unem-
ployment, or underemployment, was virtually eliminated by 
the end of the 1960s.'m In Table 3, we found that the in-
come of the lowest fifth of the Taiwan households accounted 
for 7. 71 percent of the nation's total income in 1964, it in-
creased to 8.89 percent in 1978 on the one hand, and that 
income of the highest fifth had accounted for 41.07 percent 
in 1964, but declined to 37.17 percent in 1978. It is apparent 
that the gap between the poorest fifth and the highest fifth 
has been narrowed, a more equitable income distribution 
pattern. 
72. Fei, Ranis, and Kuo, Growth with Equity: The Taiwan Case, supra note 68, p. 214. 
TABLE 2: Selected Indicators of Taiwan's Economic Growth 
Indicator 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1979 1981 
% of non-agricultural population 
in total population 47.13 49.96 50.96 55.31 60.26 66.30 67.74 71.9 
% of industrial product in net 
domestic product 13.01 14.53 16.99 20.34 28.90 32.55 34.32 42.72 
Gross national product 
(Million US$) 2110.5 3230.2 4525.5 7255.0 11979.6 18318.4 24751.6 20576.7 
Per capita income (US$) 246 316 371 520 770 1039 1288 2570 
Economic growth rate(%) NA 5.50 6.83 9.01 12.90 13.48 8.08 5.04 
(Sources: National Income of the Republic of China, 1979. Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1979. Graphical Survey of the Economy of 
Taiwan, the Republic of China, 1980. Social Indicators of the Republic of China, /983). 
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Table 3. Distribution of Household Income by Division of Equal 
Number of Households, 1964-1978 
Year Five Population Groups• 
1 2 3 4 5 Ratio** 
% % % % % 
1964 7.71 12.57 16.62 22.03 41.07 5.33 
1966 7.09 12.45 16.19 22.01 41.45 5.25 
1968 7.84 12.22 16.25 22.32 41.37 5.28 
1970 8.44 13.27 17.09 22.51 38.69 4.58 
1972 8.60 13.25 17.06 22.48 38.61 4.49 
1974 8.84 13.49 16.99 22.05 38.63 4.37 
1976 8.91 13.64 17.48 22.71 37.26 4.18 
1978 8.89 13.71 17.53 22.07 37.17 4.18 
Notes: *the five population groups are referred to their respective income. 1 represents the 
lowest 20% of the population, while 5 represents the highest 20% of the 
population in terms of the income. 
**Ratio refers to folds of the 5th group to 1st group. 
(Source: Executive Yuan, 1979. Table 16, p.45). 
2. Social and Political Modernization 
Industrialization involves the extended use of an inanimate source 
of power in the production of economic goods and service. Economic 
growth in general refers to the increase in the economy's real gross 
national product or real national income. Judging from the data we 
presented in the above section, Taiwan has successfully been industri-
alized and and has enjoyed impressive economic growth. In this sec-
tion, we shall turn our attention to non-economic aspects of Taiwan's 
modernization. We shall give a detailed assessment of such socio-
political changes as urbanization, the emergence of the middle class, 
educational attainment, health care, political participation and system 
of social welfare that reflect Taiwan's social and political moderniza-
tion since 1949. 
A. Rapid Urbanization 
Demographers and urban sociologists agree that selective migra-
tion in some form should be regarded as a necessary phenomenon of 
all modem, highly specialized societies. Donald Bogue believes, for 
instance, persons with unique qualifications, training, or work histo-
ries need to be located where their activities can be used. He says, "A 
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certain amoung of reshuffling of the population is required to locate 
the various specialized categories of population where they are of most 
value and where they can best participate in the social and economic 
system.'m Migration is an integral element of social change process. 
This is particularly true in developing nations, for the newly expanded 
economy requires the movement of selected types of persons. New 
technology and industry are likely to be located in and/or closer to 
urban centers. It is thus not surprising that internal migration in de-
veloping nations tends to move from rural to urban. 
In Taiwan, we saw the rapid increase of urban population: in 
1952, only 47.6 percent of the population lived in urban places with a 
population of 50,000 or more; in 1980, the urban population had 
reached to 70.3 percent of the island's total population. In other 
words, nearly three quarters of Taiwan's population are now living in 
urban places. Between 1952 and 1976, the averge annual growth rate 
of Taiwan's population was 3.0 percent, while the rate for growth in 
urban places was 4.6 percent. Moreover, Taiwan has also witnessed 
the emergence of two large metropolitan areas with a population of 
one million or more. Taipei has a population of 2.3 million and Kao-
hsiung had 1.2 million in 1983. 
Wen Lang Li found there seemed to be a high degree of correla-
tion between the degree of industrailization and urbanization in Tai-
wan. He discovered that the higher the degree of industrialization a 
locality has, the higher the net migration rate of that locality.74 In 
1957, Taipei was the only city with a population of 500,000 or more, 
there were four such cities in 1978, and the population of these four 
metropolisses accounted for 25.4 percent of the total population or 
52.6 percent of the island's urban population. Such a crowded urban 
population in these four metropolises in recent years has forced their 
residents to start to move to suburbs, a process of suburbanization. 
Taking the Taipei metropolitan area as an example, Kang-cheng Chen 
discovered that the distance between the average household and the 
central city of Taipei has increased significantly during the period be-
tween 1962 and 1979, particularly the years after 1970.75 Chen's dis-
73. Donald Bogue, "Internal Migration," in Philip Hauser and O.D. Duncan, eds., The 
Study of Population (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 497. 
74. Wen Lang Li, "Urbanization and Demographic Migration in Taiwan," in Wen 
Kuo and Y.M. Tsai, eds., Studies on Urban Development (Taipei: Chi-liu Books, 1978), pp. 
123-146. 
75. Kang-cheng Chen, "Urbanization and Urban Problems in Taiwan," in Wen-hui 
Tsai and Michael Hsiao, eds., Comparative Social Problems in U.S. and Taiwan (Taipei: 
Tong-ta Books, 1985), pp. 121-142. 
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covery is presented in Figure I. 
The concentration of population in urban places have pushed the 
government to implement policies aiming at improving urban living. 
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Figure I Distance Between the Average Household and the 
Central City of Taipei, 1962-1979 
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(Source: K.C. Chen, 1985, Figure 3, p. 133) 
From 1956 to 1979, for example, the government has invested a total 
of US$167. 7 million in public housing project in urban cities. Statis-
tics also show that the public housing authority has built 75,951 units 
of apartment-type dwelling. In addition, plans are now underway to 
develop three satellite "urban towns" nearby the three industrial cen-
ters of Taipei, Kao-hsiung, and Tai-chung. The new Ten-year Eco-
nomic Development Plan (1980-1989) also calls, in addition to 
economic planning, extensive and far-reaching improvement on the 
general welfare and livelihood of the people of Taiwan. The Plan asks 
for accelerating urban planning and development, construction of ur-
ban housing, improving the quality of life in urban areas, and intensi-
fying environmental protection measures against pollution and 
ecological abuses in and around cities. With nearly three quarters of 
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Taiwan's population now living in urban places, urban planning will 
undoubtedly receive more and more attention from the government. 
B. The Emergence of the Middle Class 
Alongside with the process of industrialization and economic de-
velopment, the occupational structure in Taiwan has shown a dramati-
cal change, reflected in the decline of agricultural-related population 
and the increase of industrial and professional population. An exami-
nation of Taiwan's labor force distribution in 1965 showed 43.9 per-
cent in agricultural-related activities, 21.7 percent in industrial and 
manufacturing professions, and 34.5 percent in service professions. In 
1981, however, agricultural-related activities had declined to 18.8 per-
cent, while industrial and manufacturing professions and service pro-
fessions increased to 43.7 percent and 37.5 percent respectively. The 
shift clearly demonstrates that Taiwan has moved from an agricultural 
society to an industrial and service society. 
One of the most significant features of a society undergoing rapid 
industrialization and economic growth is the emergence of an influen-
tial middle class consisting of mainly professionals and white collar 
workers. Chia-yu Hsu in a discussion on social stratification suggested 
that the middle class in Taiwan should include three groups of profes-
sions: government personnels and the staffs of educational institu-
tions, professionals and technical workers, and administrative and 
managerial workers. In 1983, these three groups occupied 28.4 per-
cent of the total employed labor force in Taiwan. Hsu observed that 
members of this middle class are "quick in their thinking, better edu-
cated, secured financial sources, and a strong sense of national iden-
tity."76 Most of the social scientists in Taiwan today agree that this 
middle class is most responsible for the success of Taiwan's economic 
development we see today. 77 
Industrialization, economic growth, and the expansion of the oc-
cupational sphere in Taiwan have all contributed to the emergence of 
an influential middle class. As a consequence, upward social mobility 
in Taiwan is attainable and frequent. A study found a great majority 
of the members of the middle class in Taiwan had a lower class origin. 
The study also found education is the main source for upward social 
mobility. 78 
76. Chia-yu Hsu, "Social Stratification in Taiwan," China Tribune No. 240, p. 44. 
77. E.g., Tsai and Hsiao, eds., Comparative Social Problems in U.S. and Taiwan, supra 
note 75. Yang, Kuo-hsu and Chi-cheng Yeh, eds., Social Problems in Taiwan Today 
(Taipei: Chi-liu Books, 1984). 
78. Hsian-yun Wang, Social Mobility in Taiwan (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1982). 
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C Education 
Students of modernization and developmental sociology have 
long recognized the significance of education as an indispensable varia-
ble in modernization of non-western societies. They have all pointed 
out education is both a cause and an effect of modernization in these 
societies.79 As a cause, education is indispensable because there are so 
many complex tasks within an urban industrial setting that require an 
ability to read and write; and as an effect, education is seen as a source 
of national pride and an index of societal development. It is generally 
true that the more education a society's population, the higher its 
socio-economic development. 
In assessing the educational attainment of Taiwan, two sets of 
measurements are analyzed: rates of illiteracy and growth of school 
enrollment. Examination of the available data pertaining to these two 
kinds of measures reveals relative significance of education in Taiwan. 
In 1962, the rate of illiteracy was 24.8 percent in the population aged 6 
years old and over; but in 1982 the rate was decreased to only 9.6 
percent. It is also interesting to note that half of those who have edu-
cations received at least the secondary education in 1983. As Table 4 
shows among those who are educated in 1962, 2.0 percent received 
college education, 13.7 percent secondary education, 55.3 percent pri-
mary education, 4.2 percent self-taught and 24.8 were illiterate; in 
1982, the distribution shows 8.0 percent with higher education, 39.2 
percent secondary education, 60.9 percent primary education, 2.4 per-
cent self-taught, and 9.6 percent illiterate. 
Another change can be seen in the increase of student enroil-
ments in Taiwan during the past twenty years. In 1962, as shown in 
Table 5, the rates of enrollment in their respective age groups were 
84.4 percent for compulsary education, 96.5 percent for primary edu-
cation, 35.0 percent for secondary education, and 3.9 percent for 
higher education. But in 1982 the rates had been improved to 99.7 
percent for compulsory education, 99.8 percent for primary education, 
85.6 percent for secondary education, and 11.4 percent for higher edu-
cation. The number of schools also shows a significant increase, from 
3.095 in 1961 to 5,738 in 1983. During the same period, the number 
79. E.g., H. Alavi and T. Sham in, eds., Introduction to the Sociology of "Developing 
Societies" (N.Y.: Monthly Press, 1982). Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, Becoming Mod-
ern (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974). Wilbert E. Moore, World Mod-
ernization (N.Y.: Elserier, 1979). C. Morse, ed., Modernization by Design (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1968). 
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Table 4. Po2ulation Aged 6 and Over b~ Educational Attainment 
In Taiwan, 1962-1982. 
Higher Secondary Primary Self- Illiterate 
Year Education Education Education Taught 
% % % % % 
1962 2.0 13.7 55.3 4.2 24.8 
1964 2.3 15.3 56.0 4.0 22.5 
1966 2.5 15.8 54.8 3.8 23.1 
1968 3.2 15.3 30.8 3.5 16.4 
1970 3.7 18.0 31.6 3.4 14.7 
1972 4.4 20.2 31.4 3.3 13.3 
1974 4.8 29.1 49.9 2.9 13.3 
1976 5.6 31.9 47.6 2.8 12.1 
1978 6.5 34.4 45.2 2.7 11.2 
1980 7.5 36.5 43.2 2.5 10.3 
1982 8.0 39.2 40.9 2.4 9.6 
(Source: The Executive Yuan, 1983. Table 34, p.75.) 
of full time teachers in all levels of schools also was increased from 
71,098 persons to 179,864 persons. 
In summary, education in Taiwan during the past twenty years 
has shown improvement in both quantity and quality. This better edu-
cated population has played a significant role in pushing Taiwan to-
ward industrialization and modernization. 
D. Healtf1 Care 
Researchers generally agree that industrialization and the subse-
quent economic and social development bring improvements in the 
general health of a population, and that the more a society is industri-
alized, the more developed its medical and health-care system be-
come. 80 In Taiwan, economic growth, an increase in national wealth, 
better income distribution, and other social developments have been 
accompanied by improving health care. This section will give a statis-
tical presentation of the improvements in health and medical-care fa-
80. Vincente Navarro, "Radicalism, Marxism and Medicine," International Journal of 
Health Service, vol. 13, pp. 179-202. World Bank, Health (N.Y.: World Bank, 1980). 
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Table 5. Enrollment Rate in Taiwan, 1962-1982 
Year 
1962 
1964 
1966 
1968 
1970 
1972 
1974 
1976 
1978 
1980 
1982 
Compulsory 
Education 
% 
84.4 
83.5 
84.4 
87.9 
91.4 
93.8 
94.8 
97.5 
99.1 
99.5 
99.7 
Primary Secondary 
Education Education 
% % 
96.5 35.0 
96.8 36.3 
97.2 38.4 
97.7 45.0 
98.0 54.1 
98.1 61.5 
98.5 63.3 
99.4 74.1 
99.6 76.3 
99.7 80.3 
99.8 85.6 
Higher 
Education 
% 
3.9 
5.5 
5.3 
5.4 
8.3 
9.0 
9.5 
9.4 
10.2 
10.5 
11.4 
Note: the enrollment rates here are the percentage of the enrolled students in their 
respective age groups. For compulsory education, the comparative age group is 
aged 6-14; for primary education, aged 6-11; for secondary education, aged 12-17; 
and for higher education, aged 18-24. 
(Source: The Executive Yuan, 1983. Table 31, pp. 70-71.) 
cilities, medical and para-medical personnel structure, and general 
health conditions of the Taiwanese population. 
The number of public and private hospitals and clinics has stead-
ily increased in Taiwan. The data for the period between 1961 and 
1980 on public hospitals and clinics operated by central and local gov-
ernments reflect a slow but steady increase. As shown in Table 6, the 
1,089 public hospitals and clinics in 1961 were increased to 1,295 in 
1980. Although the data for private hospitals and clinics before 1970 
were unavailable, Table 6 does show a rapid increase in the 1970s, 
from 6,338 units in 1971 to 9.993 in 1980. A comparison between 
public and private hospitals and clinics during the 1970s indicates a 
faster growth in the private sector. Taking 1971 as the base year for 
comparison, the index for public hospitals and clinics in 1980 was 108, 
while the index for private hospitals and clinics in 1980 was 157.7. A 
similar growth trend can also be seen in the increase of hospital beds. 
The number of hospital beds per 10,000 population has increased from 
3. 70 in 1961 to 22.41 in 1980. The expansion of hospital beds is attrib-
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utable to the growth in the private sector of health and medical facili-
ties, as discussed earlier. 
Table 6 Health and Medical Facilities 
Year Public Private 
Number Index Number Index 
1961 1,089 90.8 
1962 1,090 90.9 
1963 1,091 91.0 
1964 1,093 91.2 
1965 1,093 91.2 
1966 1,105 92.2 
1967 1,093 91.2 
1968 1,091 91.0 
1969 1,094 91.2 
1970 1,100 91.7 
1971 1,199 100.0 6,338 100.0 
1972 1,201 100.2 6,378 100.6 
1973 1,201 100.2 6,758 106.6 
1974 1,201 100.2 7,492 110.2 
1975 1,204 100.4 8,470 133.6 
1976 1,216 101.4 8,563 135.1 
1977 1,208 100.8 8,840 139.5 
1978 1,213 101.2 9,140 144.2 
1979 1,230 102.6 9,618 151.8 
1980 1,295 108.0 9,993 157.7 
Source: Executive Yuan, Social Indicators of the Republic of China, 1982. Taipei: The 
Executive Yuan, Table 37, pp. 82-83. 
The total number of medical and para-medical personnel during 
the past 20 years has also shown increase, from 12,678 in 1961 to 
42,417 in 1980, a net increase of 29,739, which include increases of 
6,764 physicians, 1,105 dentists, 10,071 nurses, 5,824 pharmacists, and 
5,375 other medical-related specialists. A detailed analysis of medical 
and paramedical personnel growth reveals the increase occurred 
largely among specialists other than physicians and dentists. As 
shown in Table 7, although physicians constituted more than half of 
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the medical professionals in the early 1960s, they have steadily de-
clined as a percentage of the medical pool ever since. In 1980, physi-
cians accounted for only 31.4 percent of the total medical and 
paramedical personnel, which reflected a decline of 20.5 percent dur-
ing the past 20 years. The percentage of dentists experienced a similar 
decline, from 6.3 percent in 1961 to 4.5 percent in 1980. Nurses and 
pharmacists, however, have both enjoyed a significant increase. In 
1961, nurses constituted 12.5 percent and pharmacists 7.5 percent of 
the total medical and para-medical professionals, but the percentages 
in 1980 showed 27.5 percent for nurses and 16.0 percent for pharma-
cists. The expansion within the medical and paramedical professions 
in Taiwan has thus been largely in the two specialities of trained 
nurses and pharmacists. 
The steady expansions of both health and medical-care facilities 
and staffs have provided better health care for the general population 
of Taiwan. The number of physicians per 10,000 population increased 
from 6.0 in 1961 to 7.5 in 1980, dentists from 0.7 to 1.2, pharmacists 
from 0.9 to 6.8, and nurses from 1.5 to 6.6. At the same time, the 
number of hospital beds per 10,000 population also increased, from 
2.70 in 1961 to 22.4 in 1980. Statistics also show that in 1961 govern-
ment health-related expenditures total US$1,076,877, a figure in-
creased to US$196,778,000 in 1982.81 
As a result of the expansion of medical and health-care services, 
the health conditions of the general population in Taiwan have been 
improved over the years. One indicator of such an improvement is the 
decline of mortality rates. During the period between 1962 and 1982, 
as shown in Table 8, the crude death rates declined from 6.3 per 1,000 
population to 4.8 per 1,000 population; the mortality rates for new-
born children declined from 31.4 to 8.1; and the maternal mortality 
rates from 8.8 to 1.9 per 1,000. Meanwhile, the average life expec-
tancy has been extended from 62.3 years for men and 57.8 for women 
to 70.2 years for men and 75.1 years for women during the same 
period. 
81. National Health Administration, Health Statistics of the Republic of China (Taipei: 
Executive Yuan, 1983), p. 30. · 
Table 7. Medical and Para-Medical Personnel Structure 
Year Total Physicians % Dentists % Nurses % Pharmacists % Others % 
1961 12,678 6,574 51.9 804 6.3 1,588 12.5 951 7.5 2,761 21.8 
1962 12,686 6,591 52.0 814 6.4 1,595 12.6 1,003 7.9 2,683 21.1 
1963 13,002 6,543 50.3 808 6.2 1,798 13.8 1,043 8.0 2,810 21.7 
1964 13,282 6,649 50.0 816 6.1 1,852 13.9 1,110 8.4 2,855 21.6 
1965 13,017 6,656 51.1 794 6.1 1,611 12.4 1,207 9.3 2,749 21.1 
1966 14,167 7.052 49.8 791 5.6 2,055 14.5 1,364 9.4 2,905 20.7 
1967 15,820 7,753 49.0 800 5.1 2,440 15.4 1,515 9.6 3,312 20.9 
1968 17,012 7,551 38.8 815 4.8 2,682 15.8 1,586 9.3 4,378 25.7 
1969 17,307 7,166 35.5 760 4.4 3,287 19.0 1,661 9.6 4,433 25.5 
1970 18,992 7,552 39.6 819 4.3 3,646 19.2 2,289 12.1 4,716 24.8 
1971 18,227 7,841 43.0 910 5.0 3,616 19.8 2,908 16.0 2,952 16.2 
1972 19,094 7,968 41.7 933 4.9 3,839 20.1 3,365 17.6 2,989 15.7 
1973 20,447 8,367 40.9 997 4.9 4,138 20.2 3,621 17.7 3,324 16.3 
1974 22,457 9,316 41.5 1,050 4.7 4,243 18.9 4,141 18.4 3,707 16.5 
1975 26,597 10,723 40.3 1,219 4.6 4,919 18.5 5,038 18.9 4,698 17.7 
1976 32,008 11,361 35.5 1,366 4.3 8,560 26.7 5,466 17.1 5,255 16.4 
1977 34,743 12,097 34.8 1,539 4.4 9,182 26.4 5,878 16.9 6,047 17.5 
1978 36,191 12,485 34.5 1,581 4.4 9,749 26.9 6,238 17.2 6,138 17.0 
1979 39,614 13,169 33.7 1,773 4.5 11,256 28.4 6,761 17.1 6,655 16.8 
1980 42,417 13,338 31.4 1,909 4.5 11,659 27.5 6,775 16.0 8,736 20.6 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China. 1981. Taipei: Executive Yuan, Table 222, pp. 632-633. Social Indicators of the Republic of 
China, 1982. Taipei: Executive Yuan. Table 37, pp. 82-83. 
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Table 8. Death and Life Ex~ectanc~ in Taiwan, 1962-1982 
Death Life Expectancy 
Year Crude. Infant Maternal M F 
Death Mortality Mortality 
Rate Rate Rate (Years) 
{0/00} {0/00} {0/0000} 
1962 6.3 31.4 87.9 62.6 67.9 
1964 5.3 25.9 79.4 63.8 69.2 
1966 5.4 21.7 71.6 64.1 69.7 
1968 5.4 20.7 54.0 63.6 69.7 
1970 4.9 16.9 40.4 66.1 71.2 
1972 4.7 14.0 34.7 67.6 72.3 
1974 4.8 12.9 32.4 67.8 72.7 
1976 4.7 10.6 29.5 68.7 73.6 
1978 4.7 9.9 29.6 69.2 74.3 
1980 4.8 9.8 18.7 69.6 74.5 
1982 4.8 8.1 19.1 70.2 75.1 
(Source: National Health Administration, 1983. Table 14,15,16, pp.58-65) 
In summary, increases in national wealth and personal income 
have contributed to an expansion of medical and health-care service 
which, in tum, has provided better health and a longer life expectancy 
for the population in Taiwan. 
E. Political Participation 
It is generally believed that economic growth in most of develop-
ing societies can not succeed without an effective political administra-
tion to coordinate its developmental programming. 82 Taiwan has 
enjoyed a remarkable degree of political stability during the past thirty 
years that have been conducive to attracting foreign investments, pol-
icy consistency and predictability, and domestic capital formation. 
Moreover, political stability brings confidence to people in the society 
and encourages the emergence of nationalism through which the im-
provement of the way of life, both socially and culturally, becomes 
82. E.g., I.L. Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 
1966). Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1968). 
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part of a nation's pride. Political stability has been achieved through 
an extended political participation from the masses. 
One indicator of such an extended political participation is the 
higher rate of voting in each election in Taiwan. Table 9 clearly dem-
onstrates a consistent higher rate of voting participation, ranging from 
seventy-three percent to eighty percent in county and city council elec-
tions and from sixty-nine percent to eighty percent in mayoral 
elections. 
Table 9. Voter ParticiQation in Taiwan, 1950-1982 
Provincial City-County Magistrates 
Term Assembly* Council** & Mayors*** 
% % % 
1 NA 80.7 79.6 
2 74.4 79.7 74.9 
3 78.2 78.9 78.2 
4 72.5 78.3 72.5 
5 69.3 73.8 69.1 
6 74.3 76.8 74.3 
7 70.3 78.0 70.3 
8 80.4 73.3 80.4 
9 71.9 80.5 71.9 
10 75.4 
Notes: 
*The first election for provincial assembly was held in 1951. 
The election has been held in every five years since 1962. 
**The first election for city and county council was held in 1950. 
There have been 10 elections since then. 
***The first election for magistrates and majors was held in 1950 and the last one held in 
1981. 
(Source: The Executive Yuan, Social Indicators of the Republic of China, 1982. Table 68, 
pp. 156-157) 
Moreover, the Nationalist government in Taiwan has also held 
several special elections to increase the membership share of the 
Taiwanese in the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and Control 
Yuan. Since the first special election of 1969, the National Assembly 
has added 76 new members to its total delegates, the legislative Yuan 
has added 98 new members, and the Control Yuan has added 32. 
Although the great majority of the membership in these three legisla-
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tive branches of the Nationalist government still are the "old guards," 
those who were elected to their seats prior to the Chinese Communists 
victory on the Mainland in 1949, the special elections have opened a 
new door for larger participation from the residents of Taiwan. More 
importantly, a recent study has found this newly elected group of leg-
islators has played an extraordinary role in Taiwan's political 
process. 83 
F. Social Welfare 
As society becomes more affiuent with the cumulation of national 
wealth, the Nationalist government in Taiwan is able to pay more at-
tention to social welfare for the less privileged population. One indica-
tor of such a concern is the increase of the government's spending on 
social welfare throughout the years. Table 10 shows social welfare 
spending by the government in 1962 was NT$1,116.9 million and was 
increased to NT$52,143 million in 1981. The increase of social wel-
fare spending is consistent with the growth in Taiwan's Gross Na-
tional Product volumes. In 1962, social welfare spending was 
approximately 1.5 percent of GNP and 7.2 percent of the total govern-
ment expenditures; it was increased to 3.9 percent and 11.8 percent 
respectively in 1981. 
83. "An Evaluation on the Performance of Members of the Legislation Yuan," United 
Monthly, No. 7, pp. 8-23. 
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Table 10. Gross National Product, Government Expenditures, & 
Social Welfare Spending in Taiwan 
Government Social Welfare 
GNP Expenditures Spending I II 
61 
Year (million NT$)* (million NT$)* (million NT$)* (%)** (%)*** 
1962 76,652 15,414.0 1,116.9 1.5 7.2 
1963 86,710 16,456.8 1,259.6 1.5 7.6 
1964 101,492 18,485.5 1,495.4 1.5 8.1 
1965 111,895 22,391.3 1,699.1 1.5 7.6 
1966 125,343 23,836.0 1,123.8 0.9 4.7 
1967 144,839 30,726.8 2,197.8 1.5 7.1 
1968 168,695 33,002.0 2,581.3 1.5 7.8 
1969 195,693 41,868.9 3,724.5 1.9 8.9 
1970 225,283 49,152.6 4,712.0 2.0 9.6 
1971 262,125 54,829.1 5,682.9 2.2 10.4 
1972 314,369 63,667.7 8,101.8 2.6 12.7 
1973 407,419 79,835.9 8,663.7 2.1 10.9 
1974 544,847 89,982.0 9,719.9 1.8 10.8 
1975 581,150 126,435.5 12,657.4 2.2 10.0 
1976 696,101 149,821.6 16,940.3 2.4 11.3 
1977 811,819 191,472.7 20,428.1 2.5 10.7 
1978 967,938 227,341.2 24,489.1 2.5 10.8 
1979 1,164,473 265,749.3 29,706.7 2.6 11.2 
1980 1,440,778 344,598.5 38,223.8 2.7 11.1 
1981 1,703,713 433,415.8 51,143.0 3.0 11.8 
Notes: At current prices. 
**I = social welfare spending/GNP X 100. 
•••n = social welfare spending/government expenditures X 100. 
(Sources: Data on GNP and government expenditures are taken from National Income of 
the Republic of China, 1981. Data on social welfare spending are calculated from the 
Yearbook of the Ministry of Finance, 1981.) 
Two major social insurances programs have been implemented in 
Taiwan: the Government Employees' Insurance and the Labor Insur-
ance Scheme. Both insurance programs include coverages for retire-
ment and medical expenses. In addition, the government also provides 
free medical treatment and care for the needy, poor, and the disabled. 
At the same time, the Nationalist government has also gone 
through the legislative process of establishing goals and procedures for 
the management of social welfare programs. Between 1970 and 1981, 
four major pieces of welfare legislations were passed: they are the 
Welfare Law for Children in 1973, the Welfare Law for the Aged in 
1980, the Welfare for the Disabled in 1980, and the Social Assistance 
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Law in 1980.84 A basic labor wage act was just passed last year to 
protect minimum wage for workers. 
Awareness of social welfare has also increased in recent years 
among the public, especially the intellectuals. An examination of pop-
ular and professional magazines and journals in Taiwan between 1969 
and 1981 shows that the number of articles and essays on topics re-
lated to social welfare published was increased from 29 io 161 during 
the period. In summary, Taiwan has successfully made progress in 
both economical and social modernizations. It is a classic example of 
macro-development by design, characterized by a mixture of state 
planning and private free capitalist economy. The state established an 
overall guideline and objective, while the private capitalist sectors put 
them into practice. The cooperation between private industrialists and 
the state has shifted Taiwan from a underdeveloped nation to a devel-
oped nation in a span of only thirty years. The success of Taiwan then 
provides an excellent model for the People's Republic of China on the 
Mainland in its current campaign on the Four Modernizations. 
VI. HISTORICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA'S 
MODERNIZATION 
The modernization process of China during the past 140 years 
has distinguished itself in several important ways that differ from both 
its own traditional reform movements in the earlier dynasties and 
modernization of Japan and other developing nations. The frustration 
and agony of China's inability to modernize itself to join the rank of 
the advanced and modernized in early years has been replaced by a 
sense of self-respect and dignity. As Taiwan has successfully created a 
"miracle," the goal of the Chinese final modernization is thus unmis-
takenly attainable. Let us identify the unique characteristics of 
China's past process of modernization. 
(1) It is a process of Westernization. As has been mentioned, 
modernization is the process of change toward those types of social, 
economic, and political system that have developed in Western Europe 
and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth 
and have then spread to other European countries to the South Ameri-
can, Asian, and African countries. In the non-Western societies, 
therefore, it is a process of what Kautsky has called "coming from 
84. Wen-hui Tsai and Ly-yun Chang, "Policy, Ideology, and Social Welfare Programs: 
A Critical Evaluation of Social Welfare Legislation in Taiwan," Journal of Sociology, No. 
17, 1985, pp. 233-262. 
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without."85 
It is precisely this process of change toward those Western types 
of social, economic, and political systems that China has been deeply 
embraced in the past 140 years. The new systems are essentially for-
eign to China and thus lack support from the traditional sector of the 
society. 
Although scholars have argued that modernization and Western-
ization are not the same process, to people of the developing societies 
the two terms are synonyms. This is particularly true in the case of 
China. The initial call for modernization in nineteenth century China 
was in response to Western dominance. The Chinese had always seen 
themselves as the center of the world before the arrival of Western 
civilization. Pye says, "the Chinese understandably developed a deep 
sense of cultural superiority. Others might be rude and militarily vi-
cious, but the Chinese had no reason to doubt, in spite of some unfor-
tunate experiences, that they were culturally the center of the world, 
the Middle Kingdom, as they called themselves. Although during the 
last thousand years of the imperial order all or part of China was ruled 
by alien conquerors, the Chinese persisted in feeling supremely self-
assured."86 
The Chinese strongly believed that their history has shown Chi-
nese civilization is so superior that it can absorb any foreign element in 
the process of "sinification," becoming Chinese. Thus, even when 
China failed to contain Westerners and lost almost every war at the 
hands of the Westerners in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
the Chinese still were reluctant to accept the fact that the West was 
superior. The self-awareness movement, as has been mentioned, was 
aimed at preserving and restoring Chinese culture while supplement-
ing it with Western "materials." But when China lost its war to Ja-
pan, a country that had been China's inferior younger brother for 
several centuries, it was the most demoralizing blow to the Chinese 
superiority complex. The only reason the Japanese defeated China, 
the Chinese leaders believed, was Japan's total Westernization. After 
this defeat, the question was no longer whether China should adopt 
Western culture or not, but how to Westernize. The necessity for an 
extensive Westernization involving military as well as socio-cultural 
change gradually became apparent. From 1895 to 1910 they founded 
schools in which Western languages, mathematics, and science were 
85. John H. Kautsky, The Political Consequences of Modernization (N.Y.: John Wiley, 
1972). 
86. Lucian W. Pye, China: An Introduction (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), p. 101. 
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taught; they studied international law, established a Western-style for-
eign office, and began to engage in Western-style diplomacy; they built 
arsenals and shipyards in which they could manufacture modern 
weapons and introduced new concepts into military training; they sent 
students abroad; and they began to think about adopting western 
methods of transportation and communication. After the 1911 repub-
lican revolution, they even established an American-style republican-
democratic government. In the period under the Nationalist rule, 
from 1912 to 1949, western-trained intellectuals consisted of the ma-
jority of Chinese new leadership. In mainland China, the isolation 
from the advanced Western nations since 1949 has been blamed for its 
subsequent backward underdevelopment. "To catch up to the West" 
has been the ultimate goal in the Chinese effort toward modernization 
from the very beginning. 
(2). It is an extensive and far-reaching process of change. The 
second major characteristic of the Chinese modernization process lies 
in its extensive scope of involvement and far-reaching consequence of 
impact. Although stability and integration had been two of the most 
distinguished traits of traditional Chinese social structure, China did 
experience ups and downs from time to time throughout its long his-
tory. Not only were there political revolutions overthrowing the old 
dynasty in favor of establishing a new dynasty, but also several large-
scale reform movements were organized in various dynasties aiming at 
changing parts of the existing social-economic institutions. But not 
any of these movements and revolutions in the earlier history of China 
can match the extensiveness in scope and result to that of the moderni-
zation attempt during the past 140 years. 
Political revolutions, social reforms, and other types of change in 
traditional China were aimed at a partial change within the existing 
social structure, and their main purposes were not for a total destruc-
tion of the systems involved, but for what Eisenstadt has called "ac-
commodable change." 
Eisenstadt argued that processes of accommodable change were 
connected with the social condition that made possible the continuous 
fundamental harmony in traditional Chinese society. Conflicts among 
different political groups were often regulated through the existing 
norms and activities of the major political and regulative institutions 
of the society. 
Modernization, on the contrary, is for a total change. It affected 
every aspect of the Chinese social structure; the traditional political 
system, Confucian ideology, moral value, religious belief, educational 
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system, and economic activity were all under attacks from the new 
systems of ideals coming along with modernization. Whether one 
likes it or not, China will change in the direction of greater moderniza-
tion or more precisely Westernization. 
Chinese intellectuals and political leaders were convinced that a 
complete overhaul of the existing social structure was necessary and 
that the inevitable solution was Westernization. 
They indicated that the age of resistance to Western civilization 
had been passed; the Chinese now should go straight ahead to a whole-
sale Westernization and a wholehearted modernization. 
As the call for modernization became the supreme goal of the 
Chinese leadership, family institution was gradually changed. The 
political system was shifted from traditional monarchy to, first, repub-
lican-democracy, then to Communism. Confucianism and folk belief 
are now being labelled as backward and superstitious and foreign edu-
cation became the highest symbol of achievement. Various competing 
systems of Western culture dominated the new China in the period 
between 1912-1949. In short, almost every aspect of Chinese life has 
been under the influence of Western culture as a result of the attempt 
to modernize during the past 140 years. 
(3). It is a revolution from the top. Although students of mod-
ernization in Western societies have generally stressed the necessity of 
the development of a modern attitude in the general population as a 
prerequisite for the modernization of a society, many researchers on 
the modernization in non-Western societies have found that perhaps 
the most important factor in these societies is the political leadership, 
and that the political style of the leaders in a society not only affects 
the type and function of political structure but also the tempo and 
destination of the society's economic and social transformation. 
Morse said: 
If modernization is a super problem-as it is-it can be re-
solved only if the group in power recognizes the problem and 
correctly apprehends its nature, if it then creates the kinds of 
organizational structures required to mobilize the requisite 
inputs and compliances, and if it gives suitable guidance to 
the search for solution to the various subproblems of eco-
nomic development, reinstitutionalization, and the like. 87 
The basic assumption here is that modernization will be easier if 
the power structure is controlled by a radical centralized modernizing 
87. Morse, Modernization by Design, supra note 79, p. 375. 
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elite, dedicated to changing basic institutions in order to create what, 
in their view and that of their supporters, will be a more just and pro-
gressive social order. 
The Chinese modernization experience offers a good example of 
the modernization initiated and directed by the political leadership. 
As we mentioned earlier, China was forced into Westernization as the 
result of Western dominance in the nineteenth century; the initiation 
of all the programs was from the top layer of the society, the leader-
ship. The great majority of the general population was not seriously 
affected by the Western threat at that time. As a matter of fact, not 
until the Communist revolution did the change finally reach villages 
and countryside. 
China did have a group of political and social leaders dedicated to 
modernization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
But what made China fail in achieving a quick strike on moderniza-
tion was the lack of a strong center of political leadership in planning 
and coordinating the various modernization programs that were put 
into practice in a hurry. Dr. Hu Shih pointed out "the difference be-
tween Japanese success and Chinese failure is mainly that Japan did 
not lose its social center; their works were continuous and accumula-
tive under that center, and every effort was tied to its central political 
organization, i.e., the Emperor. In China, we did not have any center; 
everything we did often disappeared after changes in political adminis-
tration. Policy, organization and leadership were all changed. Every-
thing had to start again from the very beginning. Nothing could be 
designed for a long term perspective."88 
Modern Chinese history showed frequent changes in national ad-
ministration because it was entirely built upon the charisma of the 
leaderships that were unstable, short-lived, and troublesome in charac-
ter. For example, during the seventeen years of the Pei-yang regime 
(1912-1928), there were seven different presidents and two vice presi-
dents of the republic, there were also thirty-three terms of national 
cabinet in which twenty-nine different people served as premiers and/ 
or acting premiers. From 1928 to 1949, there were fifteen different 
presidents and vice presidents of the Executive Yuan (the cabinet) in 
the nationalist government. The lack of continuity shown in national 
politics thus made a long term modernization programming 
impossible. 
The need for the stability of political leadership continues to play 
a crucial role in the fourth stage after 1949. This factor, perhaps, 
88. Hu, Collected Essays of Hu Shih, supra note 32, p. 533. 
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more than anything else, can be accounted for the developmental gap 
between Taiwan and Mainland China. Political stability and an inte-
grated leadership in Taiwan have enabled Taiwan to effectively imple-
ment its socio-economic modernization plans since 1949; while in 
Mainland China, constant power struggle has made it impossible for 
any programming continuity. The political leaders' vision on China's 
future, the ability of political leadership to commit itself for a long-
ranged developmental change, the strategy and planning the political 
leaders employed in developing China, and the cohesiveness of power 
structure have proved to be vital in the Chinese efforts toward 
modernization. 
(4). Confucianism and Modernization. The different develop-
mental success between Taiwan and Mainland China in the post-1949 
modernization efforts also reflects the role the traditional Confucian 
ethic played. In Taiwan, Confucian tradition is effectively mixed with 
modernity; while in Mainland China, the destruction of Confucianism 
has greatly undermined its efforts toward modernization. Evidence 
from such Confucian oriented states as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, 
and Singapore have pointed to the fact that Confucianism is after all 
not an obstruction to economic growth and modernization. 89 
Max Weber may be correct in blaming Confucianism for the lack 
of creativity and aggressiveness in pushing traditional China into de-
veloping a technological breakthrough and a capital economy. What 
Weber fails to see, however, is the great potentiality of dynamic flexi-
bility in traditional Confucian ethic that had enabled China to make 
necessary adjustment. The focus of Confucianism lies in its stress on 
the achievement of perfection in human role relationships, rather than 
the search for individual salvation or self-realization. Since an individ-
ual's position in the society is determined by his role relations with 
others, whenever those role relations change, individuals must change 
accordingly. Viewing from this perspective, society as a unit of the 
whole universe must also change if other units have been changed. 
China may not be a great creator in technological innovation due to its 
stress on conformity and integration, but China is without any dooubt 
a great adapter in making necessary changes for societal survival and 
89. For a discussion on the impacts on industrialization in East Asia from Confucian-
ism, please refer to Roderick MacFarquhar, "The Post-Confucian Challenge," The Econo-
mist, (February 9, 1980), pp. 85-92. Arthur Jones, "Where Adam Smith Meets 
Confucius," Forbes, (December 9, 1983), p. 113. Wen-hui Tsai, "A Comparison on the 
Development between Taiwan and the Other Three Chinese Societies," China Times 
Weekly, No. 48 (1986), pp. 18-19. 
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growth. Modernization might have been started in the West in the 
seventieth century, but Chinese civilization is quick to make necessary 
accommodable change as a latecomer. 
But dynamic flexibility is not the only Confucian characteristics 
that is compatible with economic growth and modernization. There 
are other salient features in Confucianism that are conducive to the 
recent development of the nations under the Confucian influence in 
Asia. Table 11 gives a concise comparison on the compatibility be-
tween Confucian ethic and the modem system of development. 
As presented in the above Confucianism is not really totally in-
compatible to modernization. Factors that are necessary for the devel-
opment of modernization are found to be very integral parts of 
Confucian ethics. Confucianism is a secular system of norms and val-
ues that has provided socio-political stability and integration for over 
two thousand years, the suppression of those Confucian ethics which 
are favorable to modernization at the tum of the century was responsi-
ble for China's inability to deal with foreign challenge. The Commu-
nists' suppression of traditional Confucianism in the People's Republic 
of China in the post-1949 era has also undermined Mainland China's 
efforts toward modernization. The historical process of Chinese mod-
ernization during the past one hundred and forty years can, therefore, 
be seen as a process of the struggle between the suppression and the 
reappreciation of Confucianism in modem context. The realization of 
Confucianism has not only made Taiwan a modernized society, but 
also moved Japan, South Korea, and Singapore to economic 
prosperity. 
VII. TOWARD A SYNTHETICAL THEORY 
1. Two General Modernization Theories 
So far, we have examined in great detail the process of China's 
modernization and the existing interpretations of that process. Now, 
we shall shift our attention to the construction of a higher level ab-
straction of a synthetical theory that could provide a better explana-
tion of Chinese modernization and that could be empirically tested 
with a certain degree of historical truth. 
In developing such a theory, we must keep in mind that the Chi-
nese experience of modernization is not occurred and operated in a 
vacuum, i.e., in an isolated environment with no external contacts. 
Rather, the whole process has been part of a world experience. China 
started its modernization as a response to external pressure and it has 
continually been affected by external factors throughout its course of 
Table 11. 
Ideological Features 
in Confucianism 
I. Stress harmony, see conflict as constructive 
and complementary to cooperation and unity. 
2. Secularism. 
3. Emphasis on political stability 
4. Encourage political leadership in guiding 
mass behavior. 
5. Believe in merit 
6. Value universalistic education 
7. Encourage free mobility 
8. Flexibility in role playing 
Confucianism and Modernization* 
Conduciveness to 
Modernization 
Unit cooperation among production, marketing. 
and consumption is needed in modem economy. 
Rationalization. 
For continuity in economic programming. 
Political legitimacy for socio-economic change 
from the top. 
Incentive for hard work. Bureaucratization. 
Education is a pre-requisite for economic 
development. 
Free shifting labor power. 
Adaptability and crisis management. 
*The compatibility between Confucianism and modernization listed here is not meant to apply to the early modernized societies such as European and 
North American societies, it is aimed at the group of "late-comers" which did not start its modernization efforts until the end of the War World II, 
especially the Asian societies. 
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development. Theories of modernization and national development in 
other parts of the world thus could be used for the construction of a 
theory for China. 
In general, modernization and national development theories can 
be categorized into two competing schools of thought: convergence 
theory vs dependency theory. Convergence theory in essence sug-
gested that internal factors such as value, culture, and social structure 
of a given society will determine the course of modernization and that 
all societies will tend to move toward a western type of new social 
structure. 
The chief feature of the dependency theory is its insistence that it 
is not internal characteristics of particular countries so much as the 
structure of the international system-particularly in its economic as-
pects-that is the key variables to be studied in order to understand 
the form that development has taken in non-western industrializing 
countries. The theory argues the sovereign states of the developing 
countries have long been dependent for an evolving mixture of tech-
nology, financing, markets, and basic impacts on the international eco-
nomic system dominated by the capitalist power. These less developed 
countries may be called "hooked" for they cannot exist without their 
dependence.90 Wallerstein declares that "in the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries there has been only one world system in existence, the 
capital world economy."91 
The great merit of the dependency theory is that it makes us 
aware how intense and complex the interactions between the devel-
oped and underdeveloped countries were. But as Smith has put it so 
adequately the theory "is biased and ideological, distorting evi-
dence."92 Smith feels the theory deprive local histories of their integ-
rity and specificity, making local actors little more than the pawns of 
outside forces. He says, "The error of this approach is . . . that it 
refuses to grant the part any autonomy, any specificity, any particular-
ity independent of its memberships on the whole. Such writing is 
tyrannical. " 93 
In comparison between the convergence theory and dependency 
theory, one can find the strength of the convergence theory lies in its 
90. Tony Smith, "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of 
Dependency Theory," World Politics, (Spring 1979), pp. 247-288. 
91. Immanual Wallerstein, The Modern World System (N.Y.; Academic Press, 1974), 
p. 390. 
92. Smith, "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Depen-
dency Theory, supra note 90, p. 257. 
93. Ibid., p. 258. 
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emphasis on those internal variables such as institutional arrange-
ments, cultural values, and demographic characteristics that have con-
tributed in the modernization of a society. In contrast, the 
dependency theory places a great weight on the external variables and 
the interconnections between the developed and underdeveloped 
countries. 
2. A Synthetical View94 
There are a few empirical questions that have to be examined if 
one is to understand fully the problems and process of Chinese mod-
ernization. Those questions can be grouped under these three head-
ings: (1) The problems of impetus, (2) the responses to the impetus, 
and (3) the structural change in society. 
(1) The problems of impetus: In any study of the process of 
modernization, the first empirical question that must be asked is "Why 
change occurred?" In the case of China, the questions related to the 
causes of change in China may include: 
a. If the traditional social structure had remained almost 
unchanged for several thousand years why did rapid 
change occur during the past 140 years? 
b. Is there any reason or factor behind such a change? 
What kind of impetus to change emerged during this 
period? 
c. Is the traditional Chinese social structure functionally 
incompatible with the modem development, as some 
theories seemed to suggest? 
d. Is there any significant change in China in the value sys-
tem or individual attitude toward social stability and in-
tegration in this period. 
e. Is the impetus to change the result of internal or external 
pressure? 
f. What was the role of the West during this period of 
change? 
(2) The responses to the impetus: once there is an impetus to 
change, the question of how to respond becomes very important. 
Some societies simply ignore the potential for change, others respond 
94. For a review on the author's earlier view on Chinese modernization, please refer to 
David King-Keung Chan, "Toward A Synthetic Theory of Chinese Modernization: A 
Revisit of a Chinese Sociologist's Theoretical Hinterland," Proceedings of the Sixth 
International Symposium on Asian Studies (Hong Kong: Asian Research Service, 1984), 
pp. 45-55. 
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slowly and conservatively, while still others respond with a very vigor-
ous program. In the case of China's modernization process, the fol-
lowing three empirical questions are most important: 
a. What was China's initial response to change for 
modernization? 
b. What was the attitude of the elite in the society toward 
the threat for change? 
c. When change became inevitable, how did China deal 
with the emerging problems? 
(3) The structural change in society: Here, we must look into 
the problem of structural conductiveness and inconduciveness toward 
change. More specifically, we must look into every major social insti-
tution--economic, political, religious, educational, and communica-
tion, etc.-to see what part they played either for or against change, 
their positions in the whole social system, and their interactions with 
other social structures. Finally, we must also look into the conflicts 
between the traditional and the new social systems and determine 
what impact they had on the advance of the process of modernization. 
From these perspectives, the following empirical questions must there-
fore be asked in the study of China's modernization: 
a. How many key traditional social systems have been 
abolished in favor of modem western models? 
b. How did these new western models work in transitional 
China? 
c. What are the consequences of such changes on the inte-
gration and stability of the society? 
The above questions on Chinese modernization cannot be an-
swered by either convergence theory or dependency theory alone. A 
synthesis is thus needed. As mentioned earlier, convergence theory is 
strong in examining internal changes in the course of Chinese modern-
ization development. Taking from such a theoretical perspective, we 
will find: 
(1) In the traditional Chinese value system, there was a lack of 
impetus for progressive change. The emphasis on harmony and inte-
gration in the main streams of the traditional Chinese ideology has 
created a highly stable and tradition-oriented society in China before 
the tum of the present century. 
(2) The traditional social and political structures built upon 
such a tradition-oriented value system was able to keep the society 
stable for several thousand years without serious challenge or disor-
ganization because traditional Chiria was, to a certain degree, geo-
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graphically isolated from other great civilizations and culturally 
superior than its own neighboring societies. 
(3) Modernization in China is basically a process of Westerniza-
tion ever since it started in the mid-nineteenth century. Many of the 
major social institutions have gradually been changed in favor of a 
Western mode of social structure. In education, political, economical, 
and ideological spheres, we have noticed the shift from tradition to 
Western modernity. 
( 4) The lack of agressiveness and the stress on harmony on Con-
fucian ethics have greatly undermined the Chinese ability to take initi-
ative for technological and socio-political breakthrough in the early 
stage of modernization. Yet, the secular and normative nature of the 
Confucianism have nevertheless made it flexible in making necessary 
accommodation to adopt and accept Western superior culture and to 
resurface its compatible features that are conducive to economic 
growth and modernization in the post-1949 era. 
Dependency theory, as has been discussed, seems to be best in 
explaining the external factors that have undercut the Chinese mod-
ernization effort. Taking from such a theoretical perspective, we have 
to pay attention to the facts that: 
(1) Contacts with the West in the nineteenth century seemed to 
explore the shortcomings of the Chinese social system and, thus, re-
sulted in a stage of disorganization and possible collapse because the 
West obviously had a superior technology than China at the time. In-
creasing contact between the West and China made the revision and 
reform of the tradition-oriented Chinese social system inevitable and 
even necessary. 
(2) China's location in the world political economy dominated 
by the Western capialist nations must be considered of prime impor-
tance in China's failure to develop industrial capitalism during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. China was quite strongly incorpo-
rated as economic and political satellites of the Western capitalist 
powers and thus lacked the autonomy to develop needed industry 
while at the same time thwarted its ability to industrialize. 
(3) The lack of a strong centralized political organization in 
modern China in coping with problems of change has created an un-
certain and ambiguous situation in which a smooth transformation 
from tradition to modernity became impossible. There was no well-
defined goal by which the members of the society could sincerely fol-
low. Everybody fought only for his own particular interest, nothing 
else. As a result, no continuity could be possibly achieved in China's 
modernization programming during the period. 
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A synthetical view of the Chinese modernization therefore must 
take into account the following variables: 
(I) Internal Factors: 
1. Demographic factors (e.g., population size and 
composition). 
2. Geographical location (e.g., its relations with the 
neighboring states). · 
3. Domestic politics (e.g., the elite integration, the at-
titudes toward modernization of the elite). 
4. Value system (e.g., Confucianism, stability and in-
tegration-oriented ideology, religious beliefs). 
(II) External Factors: 
5. International political-economic order (e.g., 
China's position in the international world order). 
6. Resources allocation and distribution (e.g., China 
vs. the developed countries) 
7. Foreign capital investment (e.g., foreign loans). 
An analysis of any of the above variables will not only provide us 
an analytical frame of reference in understanding the past process of 
China's modernization, it will also help us in making a prediction of 
the future course and final goal of China's modernization effort. The 
road toward modernization has been long and painful in the experi-
ence of Chinese people, it is about time we give this experience a thor-
ough and systematic investigation. 
Based upon the above discussion, the following propositions have 
been developed with the hope that they would be tested empirically in 
the future: 
PROPOSITION 1: The large population size China has and the 
isolated geographical location China is located 
have created an equilibrium-oriented society in 
traditional China in which stability, integra-
tion, and maintaining status quo are the 
predominate value, which in tum then con-
demn any radical progressive socio-cultural 
change. 
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PROPOSITION II: Confucianism is both conservative and pro-
gressive. As a conservative ideology in an 
equilibrium-oriented China, Confucianism 
functioned as a system-maintenance mecha-
nism in upholding status quo; As a progressive 
ideology, however, it provided a much needed 
legitimation to political and economic leader-
ship in their pursuit of radical and progressive 
change in China. 
PROPOSITION III: Elite integration is a necessary condition in the 
success of China's modernization effort. The 
more integrated the political elite at the policy 
making group is, the more likely the success of 
modernization programming and its imple-
mentation. 
PROPOSITION IV: The effective adoption of western mode of pro-
duction, technology, and system of manage-
ment is a necessary condition to China's 
economic industrialization. The more the 
political and economic elite are aware of 
China's position in the international world 
order, the more likely the success of China's 
economic industrialization and its subsequent 
socio-political modernization. 
PROPOSITION V: The more China is modernizing itself, the 
more it will share with other modernized 
socieites similar economic, political, and socio-
cultural features. Along the way, a process of 
sinification of these features will also be taken 
place. 
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
After nearly one and half century since China started its efforts 
toward modernization in the mid-19th century, success finally seems 
within reach for all Chinese. Taiwan has enjoyed a remarkable socio-
economic "miracle" during the past thirty years, while the recent 
"pragmatic" approach advocated by Mainland China under the lead-
ership of Deng Xiaoping has brought a new hope and an improved 
way of life. Although Taiwan and Mainland China are still fall apart 
in every aspect, a new process of convergence is now taking place that 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait will converge socio-economically. It is 
evident that the more Mainland China pushes its Four Moderniza-
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tions Program, the more it will follow the footsteps of Taiwan. Polit-
ical differences may still exist, but modernization will eventually draw 
these two Chinese societies closer. 
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